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PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS
CHRISTOPHER S. ELMENDORF*
ABSTRACT
For decades, legal attacks on partisan gerrymanders have found-
ered on a manageability dilemma: doctrinal standards the Supreme
Court has regarded as judicially discoverable have been rejected as
unmanageable, whereas the more manageable standards on offer
have been dismissed as insufficiently tethered to the Constitu-
tion—that is, as undiscoverable. This Article contends that a solution
to the dilemma may be found in a seemingly unlikely place: the body
of state constitutional law concerned with the adequacy of state
systems of public education. The justiciability barriers to partisan
gerrymandering claims have near analogues in educational ade-
quacy cases, yet only a minority of the state courts have deemed
educational adequacy claims nonjusticiable. Other courts have dealt
with putatively standardless education claims by holding that the
legislature must adopt educational standards, together with a system
of testing, school finance, and accountability reasonably designed to
realize those standards. If the legislature drags its feet, courts have
issued provisional remedies, which the legislature is free to update
or replace. I explain how the same strategy could be adapted for a
new generation of “representational adequacy” claims under broadly
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worded provisions found in many state constitutions. I also suggest
that by anchoring claims to the generally worded provisions about
representation found in state constitutions (or possibly Article I of the
U.S. Constitution), litigants could mitigate the downside risk of
success under the Equal Protection Clause—namely, the inducement
of responsiveness-dampening bipartisan gerrymanders. The Online
Appendix provides a state-by-state breakdown of constitutional
provisions and relevant precedents, highlighting twenty-two states
that appear ripe for representational adequacy litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
The moment for legal attacks on partisan gerrymanders may
finally have arrived. In the 2004 case of Vieth v. Jubelirer, all nine
Justices agreed that sufficiently extreme partisan gerrymanders
would violate the Equal Protection Clause, but the Court split 4-1-4
on whether these claims are justiciable, with Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy straddling the fence.1 As this Article goes to press, advocates
and observers are eagerly awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gill v. Whitford, an appeal of the first trial court decision since the
1980s to invalidate a state legislative map as an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander.2 The lower court’s decision in Whitford was
soon followed by favorable preliminary rulings in other cases in
Maryland and North Carolina.3 
Echoing the diversity of thought among legal academics, parties,
and amici in these cases have advanced a broad range of ideas about
whether and how courts should police partisan gerrymanders. But
common to all proposals on offer is a shared assumption about the
judicial role: if a constitutionally discernable and judicially manage-
able standard for policing excessive partisanship exists, it is the
courts’ responsibility to discover and apply it. This Article suggests
that courts might instead recognize an implied legislative duty to
enact a reasonable redistricting framework, including standards for
the “representational adequacy” of legislative maps. Legislatures,
not courts, would craft the legally operative standards. 
This approach would allow courts to find a constitutional violation
(abdication of the legislative duty) without committing to a particu-
lar measure of partisan fairness, and without drawing a contestable
line between adequate and inadequate fairness. It would also allow
courts to delay any decision about remedies. If the legislature in
question did not respond by enacting a reasonable framework for
redistricting, the court eventually could establish its own judicially
1. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
2. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued,
No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
3. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 240 F. Supp. 3d 376 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (three-judge court)
(per curiam) (holding that plaintiffs stated a justiciable partisan gerrymandering claim);
Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D. Md. 2016) (same).
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manageable standards, but the judge-made standards would be
expressly provisional and subject to legislative revision. By casting
judge-made standards as a temporary response to the legislature’s
failure to act, the court would be able to make the standard con-
straining—which many judges seem to think necessary for man-
ageability—without holding, implausibly, that the Constitution
entails that particular standard. Importantly, too, the approach I
suggest would allow courts to police partisan gerrymanders without
inducing the creation of bipartisan gerrymanders, a likely but
unwelcome byproduct of successful equal protection attacks on par-
tisan maps.
The legislative-duty approach might seem unprecedented, but it
closely parallels what many state courts have done in cases under
the broadly worded education clauses found in nearly all state
constitutions. That education rights jurisprudence may hold lessons
for judicial management of partisan gerrymandering litigation is
suggested by some striking but previously unremarked parallels
between these domains: The relevant constitutional text is sparse.
There is no social scientific or political consensus about how to mea-
sure the quality of the system (schools or legislative districts), let
alone about where to draw the line between minimally adequate
and constitutionally unacceptable quality. Constitutional injuries
may arise from the disaggregated, uncoordinated decisions of nu-
merous independent actors. Plaintiffs’ claims, if vindicated, would
seem to leave trial courts with enormous remedial discretion. And
the claims are acutely politically sensitive.
Yet, whereas federal courts have long resisted partisan gerryman-
dering claims, most state courts have rejected the corresponding
nonjusticiability arguments in educational adequacy cases.4 Instead,
state courts have developed coping mechanisms that mitigate the
justiciability problems, including the articulation of legislative
duties apparently designed to bring into being more judicially
manageable standards and the issuance of provisional injunctive
remedies, which the legislature may supplant.
I shall argue that similar strategies could be fruitfully deployed
in gerrymandering-of-the-statehouse claims brought under the “free
4. See infra Part II.B.
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and open elections” or similar provisions found in many state con-
stitutions. Analogous gerrymandering-of-Congress claims might
eventually be brought under Article I of the U.S. Constitution,
though litigants would be wise to establish state law precedents
first.
Whatever the Supreme Court decides in Whitford, there will
almost certainly be an important role for state courts to play in
redistricting litigation going forward. If the Court holds partisan
gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable, or announces a standard
that will rarely, if ever, be met, then most of the action will shift to
state courts. Alternatively, if the Court constitutionalizes a rigorous
partisan symmetry requirement, state courts will probably be
needed as a backstop against responsiveness-dampening bipartisan
gerrymanders. Either way, the arguments and analogies developed
in this Article open a new line of attack for litigators concerned with
the overall health of democratic systems. 
I proceed as follows. Part I briefly describes the doctrinal and
pragmatic problems with partisan gerrymandering claims as pres-
ently litigated. Part II develops the analogy to educational ade-
quacy, and explains how state courts have managed adequacy
litigation. Part III sketches an adequacy-informed template for
gerrymandering litigation and responds to objections. The table in
the Online Appendix provides a state-by-state summary of the
constitutional provisions and education precedents germane to
representational adequacy litigation.5 I highlight twenty-two states
where text and precedent suggest a particularly favorable environ-
ment for plaintiffs.
I. THREE DIFFICULTIES WITH PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS
In determining that equal protection entails the rule of one
person, one vote, the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims famously
explained that malapportioned legislative districts deprive citizens
in the overpopulated districts of “equally effective voice,” improperly
empowering a minority of the voters to elect a majority of the
5. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Appendix: Text and Precedent for Representational Ade-
quacy Claims Under Fifty State Constitutions, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 121 (2018).
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representatives.6 Soon afterwards, the Court also acknowledged that
even equally populated districts could work a similar constitutional
harm, insofar as the design of the districts in combination with
voter preferences operates to “minimize or cancel out” the electoral
voice of a politically distinct segment of the community.7 These ideas
have anchored partisan gerrymandering litigation ever since.
But equal protection challenges to partisan gerrymanders have
not lived up to plaintiffs’ hopes. In the 1986 case of Davis v. Band-
emer, the Supreme Court glossed “minimize or cancel out” so as to
all but guarantee that partisan gerrymandering claims would never
succeed.8 When the Justices returned to the matter two decades lat-
er, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, they agreed that Bandemer was useless but
split on what to do about it.9 A four-Justice plurality, led by Justice
Antonin Scalia, argued that partisan gerrymandering claims were
nonjusticiable for want of a judicially discoverable and manageable
standard.10 Justice Kennedy concurred but only provisionally; he
allowed that partisan gerrymandering claims might become justi-
ciable, if only litigants could develop a legal standard that substan-
tially constrained judicial discretion (“manageable”) while being
closely tethered to the Constitution (“discoverable”).11 The dissent-
ing Justices issued three opinions, each propounding a different
standard.12
In the most recent go-round, League of United Latin American Cit-
izens (LULAC) v. Perry, Justice Kennedy expressed his continuing
6. 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
7. See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
8. See 478 U.S. 109, 129-36 (1986) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that a partisan gerry-
mander would be unconstitutional only if it left the disadvantaged party without any means
of influence or a fair opportunity for electoral success over many election cycles); see also Vieth
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279-81 (2004) (plurality opinion) (recounting the eighteen-year
history of litigation under Bandemer and observing that no partisan gerrymandering claim
had succeeded in this period).
9. See 541 U.S. at 279-83 (plurality opinion) (discussing and rejecting the Bandemer
plurality’s standard); id. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the
plurality’s analysis of Bandemer); id. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (bracketing question
of whether the Bandemer plurality stated the proper standard to apply to statewide gerry-
mander claim, while suggesting a district-specific approach); id. at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(proposing a “fresh start” to crafting legal standards for partisan gerrymandering claims); id.
at 356-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (proposing yet another standard).
10. See id. at 281 (plurality opinion).
11. See id. at 306-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
12. See supra note 9.
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dissatisfaction with the standards on offer, including a prophylactic
rule against mid-decade redistricting.13 But Justice Kennedy and
others hinted that they might consider claims founded on some
metric of “partisan symmetry,” a political science term for balance
in the translation of vote shares into seats.14 (To illustrate, a map of
legislative districts is asymmetric with a pro-Democratic bias if a
Democratic vote share of 55 percent would probably garner 65
percent of the seats but a Republican vote share of 55 percent would
probably leave the Republicans with only 60 percent of the seats.15)
Taking up Justice Kennedy’s invitation, academics have devel-
oped new, simpler measures of partisan bias that do not depend on
counterfactual predictions about the share of seats that each party
would win under various vote-swing scenarios. Examples include
Eric McGhee and Nick Stephanopoulos’s “efficiency gap” (based on
tabulations of the number of wasted votes cast for each party’s
candidates);16 Robin Best and Michael McDonald’s mean-median
difference (the gap between each party’s median share of a legisla-
tive district and its mean share);17 and further alternatives sug-
gested by Samuel Wang,18 and Thomas Belin and his colleagues.19
As of this writing, the efficiency gap is enjoying its day in court. It
underwrites Whitford v. Gill, the first federal court decision since
the 1980s to have found an unconstitutional partisan gerryman-
der,20 as well as the recently filed challenge to North Carolina’s
congressional districts.21
13. 548 U.S. 399, 417-19 (2006) (plurality opinion).
14. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 833 (2015) (discussing the opinions of Justices Ken-
nedy, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens).
15. See id. at 843.
16. See id. at 834.
17. See Michael D. McDonald & Robin E. Best, Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics
and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases, 14 ELECTION L.J. 312, 317 (2015).
18. See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerry-
mandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1306-07 (2016).
19. See Thomas R. Belin et al., Using a Density-Variation/Compactness Measure to
Evaluate Redistricting Plans for Partisan Bias and Electoral Responsiveness, STAT., POL. &
POL’Y, 2011, art. 3.
20. See 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843, 898 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued, No.
16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
21. Complaint at 4, Common Cause v. Rucho, 240 F. Supp. 3d 376 (M.D.N.C. 2017).
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But as this Part will explain, there remain ample reasons for
concern. First, the justiciability worries that Justice Kennedy has
voiced are not about to disappear.22 Over the years many different
Justices, both liberals and conservatives, have suggested that the
political sensitivities of redistricting cases necessitate unusually
crisp, constraining doctrinal standards.23 And yet there is no prec-
edent for the Court simply to declare that one particular social
scientific measure of partisan bias constitutes the constitutional
standard, which would seem necessary if the legal standard is to be
constraining. Second, if partisan-bias claims become justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause, the likely result is a rash of
bipartisan gerrymanders, an outcome already blessed by the Su-
preme Court but which would probably have bad consequences for
Congress. Third, as Adam Cox has argued, claims about the parti-
san fairness of congressional districts (as opposed to state legislative
districts) present exceptional difficulties owing to the disaggregated
nature of congressional redistricting.24 Thus, even if the Supreme
Court upholds the invalidation of Wisconsin’s state legislative
districts in Whitford, congressional gerrymanders may remain
inviolable.
A. “Judicially Discoverable and Manageable” Standards
Since Vieth, partisan gerrymandering claims have foundered
because the “judicially manageable” standards on offer have not
been regarded (by Justice Kennedy) as “judicially discoverable,” and
because the discoverable standards have been deemed unmanage-
able.25
22. See, for example, Judge Wiliam Griesbach’s forceful dissent in Whitford, 218 F. Supp.
3d at 942.
23. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 306-07 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. 587, 589-90 (2016) (discussing the same theme in redistricting cases under the Voting
Rights Act).
24. See Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004
SUP. CT. REV. 409.
25. It is of course a basic axiom of constitutional law that courts can only adjudicate
claims that rest upon “judicially discoverable and manageable [legal] standards.” See Baker,
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Certainly there is a discoverable standard for when a partisan
gerrymander runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. It is this:
the gerrymander “goes too far.” All nine Justices in Vieth agreed
that a sufficiently extreme partisan gerrymander would be unconsti-
tutional.26 But such a know-it-when-I-see-it standard would be para-
digmatically unmanageable.27
Manageability in this domain has a very particular reference
point: the mechanical jurisprudence of one person, one vote, under
which any departure from exactly equally populated congressional
districts is presumptively unconstitutional,28 as are departures of
more than 10 percent in state and local government districts.29
Because the partisan stakes in redistricting litigation are so high,
courts must be bound (it is said) by exceptionally determinate legal
standards, so as to avoid both the fact and appearance of judicial
favoritism toward one political party or the other.30
In LULAC v. Perry, the Supreme Court’s most recent partisan
gerrymandering case, the plaintiffs suggested a prophylactic rule
against mid-decade redistricting whose “sole motive” was partisan
advantage.31 Justice Kennedy rejected this standard because it did
not require plaintiffs to “show a burden, as measured by a reliable
standard, on [their] representational rights.”32
Yet in order to show a burden on representational rights as mea-
sured by a reliable standard, plaintiffs must pick one of the several
plausible quantitative definitions of partisan bias. Then they must
choose a data source and statistical model. And finally—if the
369 U.S. at 217.
26. See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 782, 797-809
(2005) (recognizing this point and parsing the opinions in Vieth).
27. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 291 (plurality opinion) (rejecting “a totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis, where all conceivable factors, none of which is dispositive, are weighed with an eye
to ascertaining whether the particular gerrymander has gone too far”).
28. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983).
29. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (“Our decisions have established, as
a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under
10% falls within this category of minor deviations.”).
30. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Empirical Legitimacy and Election Law, in RACE,
REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 117, 122-23 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds.,
2011) (discussing this theme in cases from Baker v. Carr to LULAC v. Perry). 
31. See 548 U.S. 399, 416-18 (2006) (Kennedy, J.).
32. Id. at 418.
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standard is to tightly fetter judicial discretion—they must ask
judges to constitutionalize this particular approach to measuring
“burdens on representational rights,” and a particular numerical
threshold beyond which gerrymanders “go too far.” Proceeding along
these lines, Stephanopoulos and McGhee proposed that courts adopt
their efficiency gap measure and “set[ ] the bar [for presumptive un-
constitutionality] at two seats for congressional plans and 8 percent
for state house plans, with the further proviso that sensitivity test-
ing show that the efficiency gaps are unlikely to hit zero over the
plans’ [anticipated ten-year] lifetimes.”33 Simon Jackman, the plain-
tiffs’ expert in Whitford v. Gill, subsequently analyzed 206 maps of
state legislative districts dating to the early 1970s, and found that
95 percent of the maps with an initial efficiency gap of 7 percent or
more favored the same party throughout the life of the map.34 The
Whitford plaintiffs argued on this basis that 7 percent should be the
threshold for presumptive unconstitutionality.35
These suggestions represent perfectly reasonable ways for a legis-
lature to codify limits on partisan gerrymandering, but what in the
Equal Protection Clause or any other constitutional provision tells
courts to use McGhee’s wasted-votes measure of partisan bias, as
opposed to, for example, Gelman and King’s measure of partisan
bias,36 or Best and McDonald’s or Wang’s mean-median difference,37
or Chen’s approach based on the distribution of maps generated by
a compact-districting computer algorithm,38 or Wang’s definition of
33. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 887.
34. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 860, 905 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge
court), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017); Complaint at Exhibit 3, Whitford v. Gill, 218
F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00412-bbc).
35. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. at 860-61, 909 n.311 (explaining this argument but
declining to “reach the propriety of the 7% number” because the observed efficiency gaps in
the Wisconsin map were well in excess of 7 percent).
36. For defenses of this measure, see ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET AL., GERRYMANDERING IN
AMERICA: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE FUTURE OF
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 58-70 (2016); and Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of
Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry,
6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007).
37. See McDonald & Best, supra note 17; Wang, supra note 18.
38. See Jowei Chen & David Cottrell, Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Ger-
rymandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the
U.S. House, 44 ELECTORAL STUD. 329, 331 (2016); Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unin-
tentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL.
SCI. 239, 249 (2013).
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an anomalous map based on the current distribution of partisans
across congressional districts in the nation as a whole?39 These are
all more or less plausible ways of concretizing the idea of partisan
bias. Though technically minded academics disagree about which
measure is best,40 generalist judges are not well-equipped to arbi-
trate this debate.
It is telling that in other areas of election law, courts have
pointedly avoided creating legal standards that would privilege a
particular statistical technique or quantitative metric of political
fairness. Where courts have created bright-line cutoffs, they have
done so using raw data collected by the government and determined
by the government to be relevant to the problem at hand.41 Thus, in
malapportionment cases, the courts implemented the rule of “one
person, one vote” using population totals from the Census Bureau,
rather than transformations of that or other data produced by ex-
pert witnesses. Judges were quick to dismiss litigants’ efforts to
draw them into political science debates about how best to quantify
the concept of “voting power.”42 In cases brought by independent
39. See Wang, supra note 18, at 1289. For additional measures, see John F. Nagle, Mea-
sures of Partisan Bias for Legislating Fair Elections, 14 ELECTION L.J. 346 (2015).
40. Compare Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 855-62 (arguing that their
“efficiency gap” measure is superior to Gelman & King’s measure of partisan bias based on
counterfactual outcomes), with MCGANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 58-70 (defending Gelman
& King’s measure, and arguing that Stephanopoulos & McGhee’s efficiency gap rests on arbi-
trary assumptions about vote-to-seat swing ratio and about the number of wasted votes that
should be cast for each party’s candidates when the aggregate vote share of each party devi-
ates from 50 percent); compare also Chen & Cottrell, supra note 38, at 330-34 (arguing that
computer simulation approaches represent an improvement over previous methods that detect
partisan gerrymanders by their effects), with Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, The
Promise and Perils of Computers in Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 95-96
(2010) (criticizing simulation-based methods on the ground that no proof establishes that the
distribution of maps generated by any existing computer algorithm approximates a random
sample from the universe of all potential maps that satisfy the designated criteria), Wendy
K. Tam Cho & Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A Computational Method
for Identifying Extreme Redistricting Plans, 15 ELECTION L.J. 351 (2016) (presenting a new
redistricting algorithm with stronger theoretical foundations), and Benjamin Fifield et al., A
New Automated Redistricting Simulator Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (Mar. 15, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), http://imai.princeton.edu/research/files/redist.pdf [https://perma.
cc/G3AV-QJ9D] (same).
41. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 188-92 (1962) (examining apportionment in Ten-
nessee based on census data).
42. See, e.g., Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 697-99, 699 n.5 (1989) (rejecting
“theoretical” measures of voting power).
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candidates and third parties seeking access to the ballot, the courts
created rough quantitative guidelines based on the percentage of
eligible voters whose signatures the candidate or party is required
to gather for ballot access.43 The doctrinal standard is again ground-
ed in data (signature counts) that the government chose and deemed
relevant for rationing ballot access, not on an inventive political
scientist’s measure of how easy or hard it actually is, all things
considered, for third-party and independent candidates to qualify for
the ballot.44
To be sure, courts in some areas of election law do rely on sta-
tistical estimates of phenomena that the government does not mea-
sure itself. The leading example is racial vote dilution law under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, where plaintiffs are required to
prove that political preferences in the defendant jurisdiction are
racially polarized.45 Yet here the Supreme Court has carefully a-
voided any suggestion that there is one right way to estimate racial
polarization as a matter of law,46 and lower courts have consistently
rejected arguments for bright-line cutoffs for “legally significant”
polarization.47 The Supreme Court may yet decide to treat partisan
gerrymandering claims in the same way, inviting litigants to
present competing measures of partisan bias and giving district
judges discretion to decide whether the bias goes too far on the facts
of a particular case. But that would mean relaxing or abandoning
the manageability premise of Vieth, LULAC, and the malappor-
tionment cases.48
43. For discussion of these cases, see Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Re-
view of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 345-53
(2007).
44. See id.
45. See Elmendorf et al., supra note 23, at 589.
46. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56 (1986) (“A showing that a significant
number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates is one way of proving
the political cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim.” (emphasis added)).
47. See Elmendorf et al., supra note 23, at 609-19 (discussing judicial practices in a
random sample of cases).
48. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004) (plurality opinion) (rejecting a
“goes too far” approach).
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B. Bipartisan Lockups
Imagine that a post-Scalia Supreme Court declares that partisan
gerrymandering claims are justiciable, and tells lower courts to
police severe gerrymanders using generally accepted statistical
techniques and measures of partisan bias. No particular metric,
statistical technique, or threshold of unconstitutional extremity is
made decisive.
This declaration from the Supreme Court would substantially
alter the strategic calculus of the state legislators who carry out
most state and congressional redistricting, and of the members of
Congress who seek to influence them.49 Redistricters generally face
a trade-off between securing partisan advantage and protecting the
seats of incumbents.50 Partisan advantage is maximized by distrib-
uting reliable partisan voters efficiently, so that they comprise just
a bit more than 50 percent of the voters in as many districts as pos-
sible.51 But lawmakers who represent such districts are somewhat
vulnerable to general election challengers. Most incumbents would
prefer a “safe,” politically lopsided district.
If, following Whitford, partisan gerrymandering claims remain
nonjusticiable, redistricters will be able to pursue either partisan
advantage or incumbency protection with little risk of judicial
invalidation, so long as the line-drawers comply with the equal-
population mandate and the Voting Rights Act. Bipartisan gerry-
manders are insulated against constitutional attack by Gaffney v.
Cummings, in which the Supreme Court held that equal protection
scrutiny should be at its “lowest ebb” when a map allocates seats in
proportion to each party’s share of the electorate,52 and by LULAC
v. Perry, in which the Court stated that redistricting maps designed
to keep prior districts intact “accord with concern for the voters.”53
49. The argument of this Section largely tracks Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of
Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443 (2005).
50. See id. at 449-52.
51. See John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden, Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes
Pack, but Never Crack, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 113, 118-20 (2008). The optimal strategy changes
if the mapmakers cannot observe the partisan reliability of voters. See Faruk Gul & Wolfgang
Pesendorfer, Strategic Redistricting, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1616, 1631 (2010).
52. 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
53. 548 U.S. 399, 441 (2006).
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But if partisan gerrymanders become subject to judicial invalida-
tion while incumbency protection plans remain bulletproof, the risk-
reward calculus for legislators drawing electoral districts will tilt
toward the latter. The likely result is an increase in the proportion
of legislative maps drawn primarily to protect incumbents.
This will reduce legislative responsiveness. Bigger partisan waves
will be necessary to flip party control of Congress and statehouses.
It may also dampen the incentive of party elites to develop a party
brand that appeals to the median voter. If there are very few com-
petitive seats, a party’s loss of support from voters in the ideological
middle will barely dent its legislative representation.54 If there are
lots of competitive seats, the same loss of support could reduce the
party’s caucus to an ineffectual rump.55 The ratio of competitive to
noncompetitive districts may therefore have some bearing on
partisan polarization, although other factors are clearly at work
too.56
C. Congress and the Problem of Disaggregated Redistricting
State legislatures are generally districted by a single entity,
typically the legislature itself, pursuant to a single set of criteria
54. See Kang, supra note 49, at 459 (describing political dynamics in noncompetitive
districts).
55. See id.
56. Nolan M. McCarty, The Limits of Electoral and Legislative Reform in Addressing
Polarization, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 359, 366-68 (2011) (arguing that parallel polarization of the
House (districted) and Senate (not districted), along with other pieces of evidence, suggest
that partisan gerrymanders are not to blame for congressional polarization). I disagree with
McCarty on one important point, however. He points to the literature showing that polar-
ization has been associated with a divergence between the voting behavior of a Democrat and
a Republican representing the same district and then asserts that gerrymandering has no
effect on this—implying that it can have no effect on this. Id. at 368 & n.25. However, if
gerrymandering affects the proportion of competitive districts, it is likely to affect how
Democrats and Republican representatives vote, conditional on representing the same district
(whether competitive or not). The reason is that donors, activists, and other party elites would
like the party to be able to win control of the legislature, and they are likely to exert pressure
on the voting behavior of all of the party’s representatives, to the extent that voting behavior
affects the party brand (and their voting behavior almost certainly will affect the brand, as
it affects what legislation the party can enact or block). If the party needs to win a lot of
politically moderate districts to obtain a majority of the seats, party elites will probably
pressure legislators in most districts (not just the moderate ones) to take more moderate
positions.
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specified in state law.57 By contrast, Congress is districted by fifty
different states, pursuant to fifty different sets of state law cri-
teria.58
The disaggregated redistricting of Congress leads to a host of
difficulties for judicial policing of partisan gerrymanders, which
Adam Cox has perceptively explored.59 Cox points out that the
harms of partisan gerrymanders—such as partisan bias or minority
rule—can only be detected at the level of the legislative body as a
whole.60 To police the gerrymandering of Congress, courts must
either “develop tests to measure directly the harm of congressional
gerrymanders at the legislature-wide level” or tackle the problem
indirectly with “constitutional rules that reduce the risk that state
redistricting efforts will combine to produce a Congress-wide in-
jury.”61
Cox concludes that “[t]he first option is wholly impractical,” as a
court would have to consider all fifty congressional district maps at
once.62 The operative set of congressional district maps is always in
flux: states draw maps at different times, and legal challenges
under state law, the Voting Rights Act, and the U.S. Constitution
proceed separately in each state.63 A court trying to evaluate the
partisan fairness of the map of congressional districts would be
faced with a constantly moving target.64
Perhaps graver yet are problems that would arise at the remedy
stage. If a court determined that the aggregate map of congressional
districts plan is biased toward Democrats, for example, the court
could remedy the violation by modifying the map of districts in any
number of states. Cox points out that the choice of which state’s
maps to undo would be “essentially arbitrary.”65
57. Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, LOYOLA L. SCH. L.A., http:// redistricting.lls.edu/
who-state.php [https://perma.cc/R5UB-L22U] [hereinafter Levitt, Who Draws]. For an over-
view of redistricting, see Justin Levitt, All About Redistricting, LOYOLA L. SCH. L.A., http://
redistricting.lls.edu/ [https://perma.cc/V2NY-J4BR]. 
58. See Levitt, Who Draws, supra note 57.
59. See generally Cox, supra note 24.
60. See id. at 418-27.
61. Id. at 441.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 443.
64. Id. at 443-44.
65. Id. at 444.
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In one-person, one-vote and VRA cases, the Supreme Court has
guided remedial discretion by telling judges to follow state law and
the policy choices reflected in extant maps to the maximum feasible
extent.66 But for the congressional map as a whole, no overarching
criteria or policy choice exists. A judicial decision to remedy a par-
tisan gerrymander by, for example, remapping Texas’s congressio-
nal districts while leaving Alabama’s untouched, would privilege
Alabama’s redistricting choices over Texas’s for no constitutionally
discernable reason.67
The alternative, as Cox recognizes, is some kind of indirect, risk-
based strategy for policing congressional gerrymanders,68 such as
the “no mid-decade redistricting for partisan reasons” rule proposed
by the plaintiffs in LULAC.69 But as we have seen, Justice Kennedy
rejected that test because it did not entail any showing of “burden[s]
on representational rights.”70 This implies that an acceptable legal
standard must account for the translation of votes into representa-
tion, and thus pushes toward an inquiry into the full set of districts
for the legislative chamber as a whole, with all of the attendant
difficulties in cases about the House of Representatives.
II. THE EDUCATION ANALOGY71
The justiciability and remedial problems presented by partisan
gerrymandering claims, though hard, are hardly unprecedented.
This Part shows that they have near analogues in state court cases
concerning the constitutional adequacy of systems of public edu-
cation. But whereas federal courts have treated these problems as
reason to avoid partisan gerrymandering claims, most state courts
have deemed educational adequacy claims justiciable. It is therefore
66. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982) (per curiam); White v. Weiser, 412
U.S. 783, 795 (1973); Hines v. Mayor of Ahoskie, 998 F.2d 1266, 1271 (4th Cir. 1993).
67. By contrast, Upham v. Seaman’s principle of deference to policy judgments reflected
in state law and the extent map follows naturally from basic propositions about federalism.
See Upham, 456 U.S. at 43.
68. Cox, supra note 24, at 444-51.
69. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 416-17 (2006) (Kennedy, J.).
70. Id. at 446.
71. Some of the description of the education rights case law in this Part also appears in
Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Solving “Problems No One Has Solved”: Courts,
Causal Inference, and the Right to Education, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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worth asking whether the state court experience with education
rights litigation has been disastrous, as those who argue for the
nonjusticiability of partisan gerrymandering claims might expect.
If the state courts have done some good, it is also worth asking
whether the strategies they developed for managing the justiciabili-
ty and remedial problems in educational adequacy cases might be
adapted for a new generation of “representational adequacy” claims
about the composition of legislative bodies.
I shall use the shorthand “representational adequacy claim” to
denote any challenge to legislative districts in which (1) the plain-
tiffs claim that the quality of representation (or their opportunity to
secure quality representation) falls short of constitutional stan-
dards, and (2) the plaintiffs’ theory of representational inadequacy
requires an assessment of the system of legislative districts as a
whole. Examples include partisan gerrymandering claims premised
on the notion that citizens who support each major party should
have an equal opportunity to rack up seats in the legislature,72 or
founded on the proposition that the party that wins a majority of the
votes should garner a majority of the seats;73 ideological misalign-
ment claims premised on the idea that the median voter in the
median legislative district (with districts ranked by median-voter
ideology) should be ideologically very close to the median voter in
the polity as a whole;74 and lack-of-competition claims premised on
the notion that the system of legislative districts should include
enough competitive seats for the legislature to be appropriately
responsive to swings in public opinion.75
72. This is the premise of the various symmetry standards proposed by Grofman and
King, Stephanopolous and McGhee, Best and McDonald, Wang, and others. See sources cited
supra notes 14, 17-19, 36.
73. This is the premise of Justice Breyer’s opinion in Vieth. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 356-62 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (addressing “unjustified entrenchment”).
74. David Schleicher and I have argued elsewhere for this criterion. See Christopher S.
Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Districting for a Low-Information Electorate, 121 YALE L.J.
1846, 1875-80 (2012). Nick Stephanopoulos has developed related arguments for “ideological
alignment” across a number of areas of election law. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning
Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2015); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections
and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos et al., The
Realities of Electoral Reform, 68 VAND. L. REV. 761 (2015).
75. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253
(2006) (developing a theory of lack-of-competition claims grounded in Article I and the First
Amendment); see also Brief for Samuel Issacharoff, Burt Neuborne & Richard H. Pildes as
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Section A draws out the justiciability and remedial commonalties
between educational adequacy claims and (potential) representa-
tional adequacy claims. Section B describes the strategies state
courts have used to manage educational adequacy litigation.
A. Of Political Thickets and Stygian Swamps: Barriers to Judicial
Review
The arguments for courts to stay out of educational adequacy and
representational adequacy disputes are very similar. The relevant
constitutional text is sparse. There is no generally accepted measure
of the quality of the system (education or representation), let alone
a shared norm about where to draw the line between minimally
adequate and constitutionally unacceptable quality. Constitutional
injuries may arise from the disaggregated, uncoordinated decisions
of numerous independent actors. The claims if vindicated would
leave trial courts with enormous remedial discretion. And the claims
are acutely politically sensitive.
1. Sparse Constitutional Text
a. Education—State Constitutions
Forty-nine of the fifty state constitutions expressly provide for a
system of public schools.76 The education clauses typically state that
the legislature “shall” establish a system of public schools, implying
a mandatory duty.77 But the texts offer scant guidance for courts
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Nos. 05-204, 05-
254, 05-276, 05-439) (advancing the same theory).
76. William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1661 (1989).
77. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 183 (“The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation,
provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.”); N.C. CONST. art.
IX, § 3 (“The General Assembly shall provide that every child of appropriate age and of suffi-
cient mental and physical ability shall attend the public schools, unless educated by other
means.”); OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (“The Legislature shall provide for the compulsory at-
tendance at some public or other school, unless other means of education are provided, of all
the children in the State who are sound in mind and body.”); PA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (“The
General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient
system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.”).
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asked to determine whether the school system is qualitatively ade-
quate.
Scholars have roughly grouped the education clauses into four
categories.78 The least demanding provisions state only that the
legislature “shall establish” a system of public schools, or free public
schools.79 Education clauses in the second category describe the
school system in very loose qualitative terms, typically calling for
a system of “efficient,” “thorough,” or “thorough and efficient”
schools.80 In the third group are education clauses with an evocative
preamble and, arguably, a somewhat stronger mandate.81 An ex-
emplar is Article IX of the California Constitution, which reads: “A
general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Leg-
islature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”82
The most demanding provisions describe education as a “funda-
mental,” “paramount,” or “primary” duty of the state.83 They do not,
however, feature any more specific articulation of a constitutional
standard of quality.84
In view of the ubiquitous lack of detail concerning educational
adequacy, or even the appearance of the word “adequacy” in the
constitutional text, it is perhaps unsurprising that empirical studies
have found no correlation between the type of education clause and
judicial rulings on justiciability and other matters.85
78. This paragraph draws on Erica Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The
Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 66-70 (1974); Gershon M. Ratner,
A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 777, 814-16 (1985); and Thro, supra note 76, at 1661-70.
79. See Grubb, supra note 78, at 67.
80. See id. at 67-68.
81. See id. at 68-69.
82. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
83. See Grubb, supra note 78, at 69-70.
84. As Clay Gillette has observed, the qualitative adjectives found in extant education
clauses are “inherently nebulous.” Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School
Finance: A Cautionary Note, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 37, 37 (1996).
85. See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV.
701 (2010); Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis, 63
ALB. L. REV. 1101 (2000); Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation: Why Are Some
State Supreme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV 1147 (2000); Yohance
C. Edwards & Jennifer Ahern, Note, Unequal Treatment in State Supreme Courts: Minority
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b. Representation—Federal Constitution
Representational adequacy claims under the U.S. Constitution
have, to date, mostly consisted of equal protection claims brought by
political parties, although lately plaintiffs have also invoked the
First Amendment at the invitation of Justice Kennedy.86 Needless
to say, the text of the First Amendment and the text of the Equal
Protection Clause are equally silent on standards of fair and effec-
tive representation. 
The most plausible alternative—assuming the Supreme Court is
not about to jettison the long line of cases holding the Guarantee
Clause nonjusticiable—is to found representational adequacy claims
under the U.S. Constitution on Article I.87 Section 2 of Article I pro-
vides that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be ... chosen ... by
the People of the several States.”88 Yet Article I also provides that
the “Electors” for congressional elections are those qualified to vote
for “the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature,”89 and that
state legislatures shall prescribe by law the time, place, and manner
of congressional elections, which regulations Congress “may at any
and City Schools in Education Finance Reform Litigation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 326 (2004). But
see Bill Swinford, A Predictive Model of Decision Making in State Supreme Courts: The School
Financing Cases, 19 AM. POL. Q. 336, 347 (1991) (finding a weak relationship concerning
equality-oriented claims).
86. Following Justice Kennedy’s invitation, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), two district courts have recently adopted First
Amendment arguments, see Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1026, 2018 WL 341658,
at *62 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 1, 2018) (three-judge court). However, efforts to ground partisan gerry-
mandering claims in the First Amendment run against the grain of many previous Supreme
Court decisions rejecting efforts to build a functional theory of voter/party rights into the First
Amendment. Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 595-98 (D. Md. 2016) (three-judge
court). See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 1051, 1084-89 (2010) (discussing underenforcement of constitutional norms of demo-
cratic accountability); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 101-130 (2004) (critiquing
the Supreme Court’s political party rights jurisprudence for relying on analogies to private
expressive associations).
87. For a careful argument, grounded in the Federalist Papers, that Article I impliedly
limits partisan bias in congressional districts, see MCGANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 205-10;
see also Franita Tolson, Election Law “Federalism” and the Limits of the Antidiscrimination
Framework, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2211 (2018) (investigating the history of the Elections
Clause of Article I).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
89. Id.
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time by Law make or alter.”90 Reading these provisions together,
one might infer that voter qualifications and time, place, and man-
ner regulations must be such as to enable the People to make a
substantively meaningful choice about the composition of Congress.
To put this point a bit differently, the language “chosen ... by the
People” in Section 2 may establish by implication substantive stan-
dards of representativeness and responsiveness for the House of
Representatives, the wing of the federal government that the Fram-
ers expected to be most closely tethered to public opinion.91 It may
also imply a corresponding responsibility on the part of Congress
and the state legislatures to exercise their delegated powers in
furtherance of those standards.
The education analogy is instructive. Courts have found states
with formally free public schools but many dysfunctional school
districts liable for failing to maintain a “system of public schools”
within the meaning of the state’s constitution.92 The very idea of a
“system of public schools” (or a “thorough and efficient” system) ar-
guably implies some minimal level of quality. So too, the very idea
of a legislative body “chosen ... by the People” implies some minimal
level of responsiveness to shifts in public opinion, and some minimal
correspondence between the ideology/party of the median legislator
and that of the median voter or citizen.
c. Representation—State Constitutions
The vast majority of state constitutions include both general prov-
isions about the right to vote and fair elections,93 and specific criter-
ia for districting.94 (See the Online Appendix for a state-by-state
90. Id. § 4.
91. The argument that Article I impliedly limits congressional gerrymander is fleshed out
in MCGANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 205-10.
92. See Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School Finance
Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2011).
93. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV.
89 app. (2014); James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymander-
ing Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 647-49 (2004).
94. For a summary, current as of 2010, see Justin Levitt, Where the Lines Are Drawn—
State Legislative Districts, LOYOLA L. SCH. L.A., http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-tablestate.
php [https://perma.cc/RLW7-VNEB].
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summary.95) The general provisions are exemplified by clauses that
guarantee “free” or “free and equal” elections, or elections with
“purity” and “integrity.”96 A small number of state constitutions also
provide explicitly for “equal representation” or an “equal right to
elect” state officials.97 As in the education domain, these general
provisions are often coupled to a legislative delegation, set forth in
mandatory terms. For example: “The General Assembly by law shall
... insure ... the integrity of the election process.”98 This implies a
legislative duty.
But in contrast to the education domain, where criteria for school
quality are generally missing, nearly every state constitution lists
95. Elmendorf, supra note 5.
96. Gardner, supra note 93, at 648. Josh Douglas reports that twenty-six state constitu-
tions have terms requiring “free,” “free and open,” or “free and equal” elections, and that
nearly all state constitutions confer an affirmative right to vote. Douglas, supra note 93, at
103, app. James Gardner suggests that the clauses granting the right to vote could provide
the hook for partisan gerrymandering claims. See Gardner, supra note 93, at 647-52. Here I
am skeptical. As Douglas shows in the appendix to his article, most of these provisions are
cast in terms of voter qualifications. See Douglas, supra note 93, app. But a provision defining
who is qualified to vote need not imply anything about the system of districts for aggregating
votes into representation.
97. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. IX (“[T]he inhabitants of this commonwealth ... have
an equal right to elect officers, and to be elected, for public employments.”); N.H. CONST. pt.
1, art. XI (“[E]very inhabitant of the state of 18 years of age and upwards shall have an equal
right to vote in any election.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“[E]very inhabitant of this State pos-
sessing the qualifications provided for in this Constitution shall have an equal right to elect
officers and be elected to fill public office.”); W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“Every citizen shall be
entitled to equal representation in the government, and, in all apportionments of representa-
tion, equality of numbers of those entitled thereto, shall as far as practicable, be preserved.”).
98. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 4; accord ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 12 (“There shall be enacted
registration and other laws to secure the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the
elective franchise.”); COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 11 (“The general assembly shall pass laws to
secure the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective franchise.”); DEL.
CONST. art. V, § 1 (“[T]he General Assembly may by law prescribe the means, methods and
instruments of voting so as best to secure secrecy and the independence of the voter, preserve
the freedom and purity of elections and prevent fraud, corruption and intimidation thereat.”);
MD. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“The General Assembly shall pass Laws necessary for the preservation
of the purity of Elections.”); MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The legislature shall enact laws to
preserve the purity of elections.”); MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“The legislature ... shall insure
the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the electoral process.”); N.M. CONST. art.
VII, § 1 (“The legislature shall enact such laws as will secure the secrecy of the ballot and the
purity of elections and guard against the abuse of elective franchise.”); WYO. CONST. art. VI,
§ 13 (“The legislature shall pass laws to secure the purity of elections, and guard against
abuses of the elective franchise.”).
2018] EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 1625
some substantive criteria specifically for legislative districts.99
(Perhaps this is why plaintiffs have almost entirely overlooked the
possibility of challenging gerrymanders under the generally worded
electoral provisions.100) Taking the lay of the land circa 2010, Justin
Levitt reported that forty-five of the fifty state constitutions require
population equality among state legislative districts, twenty-eight
call for districts to track political subdivision boundaries, and seven
codify “community of interest” districting criteria.101 Levitt noted
that five state constitutions also include a prohibition on “undue
favoritism” toward political factions, or require competitive dis-
tricts.102 (By my count there are now seven such states.103)
The existence of explicit constitutional criteria for legislative dis-
tricts may support representational adequacy claims in some states,
and hinder the claims in others. The criteria are obviously helpful
insofar as they target the very thing the plaintiff wants to attack.
For example, partisan gerrymandering claims should be available
in Hawaii, whose constitution states, “No district shall be so drawn
as to unduly favor a person or political faction.”104 Similarly, insuf-
ficient competition claims should be justiciable in Arizona, whose
constitution provides, “[C]ompetitive districts should be favored
99. See Levitt, supra note 94.
100. In Part III.E.4, I survey state court redistricting decisions following the 1990, 2000,
and 2010 rounds of redistricting. Only two decisions mention the generally worded electoral
provisions of the state’s constitution, and the plaintiffs in one of those cases never explained
to the court what that provision requires (in the redistricting context) beyond compliance with
the population equality, compactness, and contiguity criteria also specified in the consti-
tutional text. See Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 33 (Mo. 2012) (stating that because the
plaintiffs’ “free-and-open elections” argument was predicated on the state’s alleged failure
to comply with specified redistricting criteria under another provision of the state consti-
tution, the failure of the latter argument necessarily implied the failure of the former). As
Part III.E.4 also explains, three other redistricting claims invoked generic “government in the
public interest”-type provisions of a state constitution, which the courts deemed nonjusticiable
or unenforceable by private litigants. 
101. See Levitt, supra note 94; see also James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation
Without Party: Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 894-95 (2006) (“By far the most common, and oldest, anti-gerrymandering
provisions are those requiring election districts to be ‘contiguous,’ a provision appearing today
in thirty-seven state constitutions, and ‘compact,’ a requirement imposed by twenty-four
constitutions.” (footnote omitted)).
102. See Levitt, supra note 94.
103. See Elmendorf, supra note 5.
104. HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2). 
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where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other
goals.”105
Yet if the constitution only lists criteria like compactness, con-
tiguity, and respect for subdivision boundaries or communities of
interest, a court might infer that these criteria are exclusive,106 or,
even if nonexclusive, that the constitution’s theory of representation
is concerned solely with the integrity of what Nick Stephanopoulos
calls “territorial communities.”107 If so, general constitutional pro-
visions about “free and open” elections, “equal representation,” or
elections with “integrity” would not support representational ade-
quacy claims premised on a lack of competitive districts, partisan
bias, or nonalignment of the median district with the polity-wide
median voter.108
105. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1, cl. 14(F).
106. See, e.g., Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814, 819-20 (Ohio 2012) (refusing to infer a
general command of partisan neutrality from textual requirements of compactness, contiguity,
and equality of population).
107. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1379 (2012). James Gardner has persuasively argued that long-standing state
constitutional requirements of contiguity and compactness reflect this theory of repre-
sentation. See Gardner, supra note 93. He notes that a couple of state courts have construed
such redistricting criteria as exclusive, id. at 969 n.319, but also observes that more general
provisions of the state constitution concerning elections might be read to embody a different
theory of representation, particularly given the state constitutional legacy of the Progressive
and Populist movements, see id. at 969-70.
108. Such general electoral provisions would be held not to apply to redistricting. It might
be said, for example, that the “purity” and “integrity” of elections is solely a function of wheth-
er all eligible voters (and no others) may vote, free of coercion, and have their votes counted.
In a few constitutions, the immediate textual context of the provisions about “pure” elections,
or elections with “integrity,” suggests that these provisions are mainly concerned with fraud
in the casting and counting of ballots. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. II, § 6 (“Provision shall be
made by law for the registration of the names of the Electors within the counties of which they
may be residents and for the ascertainment by proper proofs of the persons who shall be
entitled to the right of suffrage, as hereby established, to preserve the purity of elections.”);
S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (“Every United States citizen eighteen years of age or older who has
met all residency and registration requirements shall be entitled to vote in all elections and
upon all questions submitted to the voters of the state unless disqualified by law for mental
incompetence or the conviction of a felony. The Legislature may by law establish reasonable
requirements to insure the integrity of the vote.”); TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The General
Assembly shall have power to enact laws requiring voters to vote in the election precincts in
which they may reside, and laws to secure the freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot
box.”); TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (“[T]he Legislature shall provide for the numbering of tickets
and make such other regulations as may be necessary to detect and punish fraud and preserve
the purity of the ballot box.”).
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But it need not follow from the existence of constitutionally cod-
ified “traditional districting criteria” that more general electoral
provisions cannot support representational adequacy claims about
fairness and competition at the level of the legislature as a whole.
No state constitution states that the listed districting criteria are
exclusive.109 Perhaps the listed criteria are simply those the constitu-
tion’s framers were able to foresee and agree upon as important, and
that the legislative duty to guarantee electoral integrity, equal rep-
resentation, or “free and equal” elections obligates the legislature to
spell out and act upon additional redistricting criteria as societal
knowledge, norms, and redistricting technology evolve.110
2. No Generally Accepted, Unidimensional Metric of Quality
If there were a political or social scientific consensus about how
to measure the quality of schools or representation, the constitu-
tional text’s lack of specificity might not represent a large barrier to
the justiciability of adequacy claims. Judges could simply declare a
“judicially manageable” standard using the accepted measure of
quality, and the underlying consensus would insulate judges against
the charge of reading their personal political views into the con-
stitution.
But there is no such consensus in either domain, and the barriers
to consensus run deep. In both domains, “quality” has multiple
dimensions, and reasonable people will disagree about the relative
importance of progress on this or that dimension. Trade-offs are
omnipresent. Measurement problems are vexing too. Some dimen-
sions of quality are easier to observe than others, but even as to
easier-to-measure dimensions, experts are continually debating, re-
working, and refining the available metrics.
109. My research assistants looked up the relevant language in each state constitution and
found no language indicating that the listed criteria are exclusive.
110. Cf. Gardner, supra note 101, at 969-70 (suggesting that general electoral fairness pro-
visions, read against the Progressive and Populist history of many state constitutions, might
reasonably be understood to limit partisanship in districting).
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a. School Quality
State courts have justified their involvement in school-quality
cases with reference to the “fundamental” importance of education
for children’s future participation in the political, economic, and
social life of the community.111 Given this foundation, one might
expect courts to evaluate the quality of public schools in terms of
their impact on students’ future rates of voting, employment, incar-
ceration, and the like. A school system would be deemed inadequate
if the state had failed to adopt policies or programs that would
demonstrably improve students’ adult outcomes at reasonable cost.
Yet there is very little credible evidence concerning the effects of
alternative educational policies or programs on such long-run out-
comes.112 And even if credible evidence did exist, on what basis is a
court to second-guess the legislature’s judgment about which adult
outcomes to prioritize?
One response is to define the constitutional minimum standard
of adequacy solely in terms of basic literacy and numeracy skills,
which are useful in all of life’s domains and which may be measured
with standardized tests.113 But as the contentious politics of edu-
cational testing well illustrate,114 there is no consensus about how
111. See INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY AND OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATION IN THE 50 STATES 2-3
(2008) (arguing that state constitutional education clauses are universally grounded on
perceived importance of education for democracy and economic opportunity). This is true of
nearly all of the state constitutional decisions about education rights, whether grounded on
an “equity” or “adequacy” theory. For equity/equal protection examples, see Serrano v. Priest,
487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 372-73 (Conn. 1977); and
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). For adequacy cases making the same point, see,
for example, Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190, 212 (Ky. 1989);
Hancock v. Commissioner of Education, 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (Mass. 2005) (Marshall, C.J.,
concurring); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995);
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va.
1979); and Campbell County School District v. State, 181 P.3d 43, 50 (Wyo. 2008).
112. See generally Elmendorf & Shanske, supra note 71 (reviewing literature and explain-
ing its shortcomings in terms of state control over the production of knowledge about the
effects of educational interventions on long-run outcomes).
113. In the early- to mid-2000s, some commentators hoped that the federal No Child Left
Behind Act, which established testing and reporting requirements, would come to anchor
state constitutional education rights litigation. See, e.g., Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson,
The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisal, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT
OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 1, 2, 16-17 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007).
114. On the politics of testing, see generally LORRAINE M. MCDONNELL, POLITICS, PERSUA-
SION, AND EDUCATIONAL TESTING (2004); and Ashley Jochim & Patrick McGuinn, The Politics
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to measure such skills, or about prioritizing them over other
instructional objectives, such as the inculcation of “grit” and socio-
emotional competencies.115 Nor does the normative foundation of the
education right support such a lexical prioritization: an adult who
is poor and marginally literate, yet also free and a regular voter,
participates more fully in the political, economic, and social life of
the community than an adult who, while better at reading and
math, never votes and ends up spending a good share of his years in
prison (perhaps a consequence of his failure to develop fellow feeling
and conflict resolution skills as a youngster).116
b. Representational Quality
As with schools, so too with representation—there are lots of dif-
ferent, reasonable criteria that one might use to evaluate the overall
quality of a system of legislative districts.117 These include ideologi-
cal alignment between the median legislative district and the
median voter in the polity as a whole;118 partisan bias in “wasted
of the Common Core Assessments, 16 EDUC. NEXT 45 (2016).
115. Cf. ANGELA DUCKWORTH, GRIT: THE POWER OF PASSION AND PERSEVERANCE (2016);
Joseph A. Durlak et al., The Impact of Enhancing Students’ Social and Emotional Learning:
A Meta-Analysis of School-Based Universal Interventions, 82 CHILD DEV. 405 (2011). 
116. The Nobel laureate James Heckman and coauthors have argued that the impressive
long-term economic impacts of certain early childhood educational experiments are due to the
inculcation of socio-emotional competencies. See, e.g., Flavio Cunha, James J. Heckman &
Susanne M. Schennach, Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill
Formation, 78 ECONOMETRICA 883 (2010); Mathilde Almlund, Angela Lee Duckworth, James
Heckman & Tim Kautz, Personality Psychology and Economics (Inst. for the Study of Labor,
Discussion Paper No. 5500, 2011); James J. Heckman, Seong Hyeok Moon, Rodrigo Pinto,
Peter Savelyev & Adam Yaritz, A New Cost-Benefit and Rate of Return Analysis for the Perry
Preschool Program: A Summary (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Policy Paper No. 17, 2010).
Some recent evidence from well-designed experiments also indicates that such interventions
substantially increase the treated children’s future political participation as adults. See D.
Sunshine Hillygus et al., The Nitty Gritty: The Unexplored Role of Grit and Perseverance in
Voter Turnout (June 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm? abstract_id=2675326 [https://perma.cc/CB3F-ULU4].
117. For a helpful summary, see Altman & McDonald, supra note 40, at 84-85. Opponents
of judicial policing of partisan gerrymanders have emphasized the diversity of plausible norm-
ative criteria. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The
Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649,
666-72 (2002). 
118. See sources cited supra note 74.
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votes” or in the translation of votes into legislative representation;119
representation for territorial communities of interest;120 descriptive
representation for historically marginalized groups;121 and congru-
ence between legislative district boundaries and media-market
boundaries, in the interest of informed voting.122
As in the education domain, there are ongoing social scientific
debates about how to measure many of these goods. For example,
should community-of-interest criteria be implemented using subjec-
tive expressions of identity voiced at public meetings, or objective
measures of commonality gleaned from census data?123 Should par-
tisan bias be measured using the observed or expected number of
wasted votes, a summary measure of asymmetry in the estimated
votes-to-seats curve, or simple gaps between the mean number of
partisans in a district and the median?124
Perhaps more daunting than the measurement problems are the
trade-offs. Progress on one normative dimension may require sac-
rifices on another. For example, the concentration of Democrats and
liberals in urban centers means that achieving a reasonable number
of competitive districts, or ideological congruence between the me-
dian district and the median voter, may require drawing “pie slice”
districts that combine city-center liberals with suburban and ex-
urban conservatives, in violation of community-of-interest crite-
ria.125
119. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
120. For an elaboration and defense of the territorial community norm for districting, see
Stephanopoulos, supra note 107.
121. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN R. GROSE, CONGRESS IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND REPRESEN-
TATION IN WASHINGTON AND AT HOME (2011); Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent
Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes,” 61 J. POLITICS 628 (1999).
122. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 74, at 1861-71 (reviewing evidence concerning
media-market/district congruence and informed voting). This may become less important in
the social-media era. 
123. For the objective approach, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1903 (2012). For the subjective, see Karin Mac Donald & Bruce E. Cain, Com-
munity of Interest Methodology and Public Testimony, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609 (2013).
124. For arguments in favor of each of these approaches, see sources cited supra notes 36-
40.
125. See Chen & Rodden, supra note 38, at 241-47.
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3. Disaggregated Decision-Making and Remedial Discretion
As Part I.C explained, any challenge to the overall quality of the
system of congressional districts would be greatly complicated by
the disaggregated, state-by-state nature of congressional redistrict-
ing. Disaggregated districting makes it difficult for courts to pin
down the then-operative map of congressional districts, and leaves
courts with tremendous remedial discretion.
These difficulties have near analogues in the education domain.
Just as the overall quality of congressional representation is the
joint product of federal statutes addressing the time, place, and
manner of congressional elections and the decisions of fifty different
states about the same matters, the overall quality of a state’s sys-
tem of public schools is the joint product of state-level decisions and
those of scores of cities, counties, and local school boards. Pointing
to these complexities, defendants have often tried to escape liability
in education-quality cases by arguing that their decisions were not
the proximate cause of poor schools or bad educational outcomes.126
The multilayered and substantially disaggregated nature of public
school governance also means that the overall quality of a state’s
school system, like the overall quality of the system of congressional
districts, is something of a moving target.
Because the overall quality of the school system is a joint product
of state and local decisions, courts in education cases have enormous
remedial discretion. They can target state legislative decisions, state
administrative decisions, or local school board decisions. Interest
groups will show up in court with predictably and radically different
demands. Should the court order the state to spend a lot more on
“failing” schools, as teachers’ unions and local school boards will de-
mand?127 Should the court undertake to reform teacher compensation
126. Cf. Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, No. BDV-2002-528, 2008 Mont.
Dist. LEXIS 483, at *72 (Dec. 15, 2008) (“As a result of viewing all of the pie charts, bar
graphs and other exhibits presented by the parties, often hashing over the very same numbers
with very different results, the Court is unclear whether the problems currently experienced
by the Plaintiff districts are a result of a constitutionally inadequate funding system or by
choices made by the school districts. The answer to this question is most likely obscured by
... competing interests.”). For more on causation defenses in education rights litigation, see
Elmendorf & Shanske, supra note 71 (manuscript at 17 & n.58) (citing Derek W. Black, Civil
Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to be Learned, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1731-57 (2012)).
127. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 412 (N.J. 1990) (requiring state to provide
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and tenure rules, as conservative plaintiffs and intervenors nowa-
days request?128 Should the court tell the state to reallocate funds
from special education to better serve disadvantaged children with
greater cognitive capacity, as a Connecticut trial judge recently de-
cided?129 Should the court order the state to adopt new, more flexible
rules for state control of local school boards, as an Alaska trial judge
did?130 Should the court appoint a special master who will tell the
state how much to spend, and the school boards how to spend it, as
New Jersey’s courts have done?131 The possibilities are endless.
4. Politics and Judicial Authority
Justice Felix Frankfurter famously proclaimed that malappor-
tionment cases are essentially “party contests” whose adjudication
would sap public confidence in the courts’ impartiality, and hence
the courts’ authority.132 Judges would come to be seen as partisans
in robes rather than neutral arbiters of individual rights. Frank-
furter’s warning has shaped redistricting litigation ever since, no
doubt informing the rigid equal-population standard for malappor-
tionment claims and leaving many judges extremely reluctant to
entertain partisan gerrymandering claims absent a similarly con-
straining doctrinal standard.
Education cases are not partisan in quite the same way. Control
of the government does not turn on the court’s decision. Rather,
these cases present “political questions” and threats to judicial
additional funding for special needs of students in high poverty districts); Abbeville Cty. Sch.
Dist. v. State, 777 S.E.2d 547, 549 (S.C.) (ordering cost study subject to de novo judicial
review), superseded by 780 S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 2015); State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d
518 (Wyo.) (applying strict scrutiny and faulting legislature’s cost study in various respects),
modified on reh’g, 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001).
128. See, e.g., Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5-7 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 27, 2014), rev’d, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), modified, 246 Cal. App. 4th
619 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
129. Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, No. X07HHDCV145037565S,
2016 WL 4922730, at *27-32 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2016).
130. Moore v. State, No. 3AN049756, 2007 WL 8310251, at *82 (Alaska Super. Ct. June 21,
2007).
131. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V ), 710 A.2d 450, 473 (N.J. 1998) (summarizing affirmed
lower court order), clarified, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000).
132. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) (plurality opinion); accord Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 324 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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authority in an older sense: there is an acute risk of protracted con-
flict with other branches of government.133 Remedial orders may be
ignored. Legislators who do not want courts telling them how much
to spend or where to spend it may retaliate by cutting the judiciary’s
budget. Judicial opinions and directives will be scrutinized by the
press; critics will question their constitutional foundations. Well-
organized groups (catering to the narrow self-interest of middle-
class suburban parents who do not want their neighborhood schools
disrupted or their tax bills to skyrocket) may push for recall elec-
tions, arguing that “activist judges” have overstepped their role.
These are not idle speculations. In Kansas, the legislature respon-
ded to school finance rulings by stripping the state supreme court
of administrative control over trial courts.134 A later bill stipulated
that if the administrative limitation were held unconstitutional, all
public spending on the court system would immediately cease.135
The Kansas Supreme Court responded by threatening to enjoin all
state spending on public schools unless the state appropriated suf-
ficient funds for poor schools by a specified date.136 Lawmakers then
introduced a bill broadening the grounds for impeachment.137
Washington’s Supreme Court held the legislature as a whole in
contempt for failing to fix the public schools.138 Ratcheting up the
pressure, the court fined the legislature $100,000 a day for missing
133. Cf. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903) (refusing to adjudicate an alleged
Fifteenth Amendment violation because of remedial concerns while hinting that such claims
might become justiciable if the United States were a party and prepared to enforce the court’s
decision). 
134. See Solomon v. Kansas, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.brennan
center.org/legal-work/solomon-v-kansas [https://perma.cc/2MQF-8CAC].
135. See id.
136. See Erik Eckholm, Outraged by Kansas Justices’ Rulings, Republicans Seek to Reshape
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/02/us/outraged-by-kansas-
justices-rulings-gop-seeks-to-reshape-court.html [https://perma.cc/TV3k-66NM].
137. See id.; see also Attempt to Enact Constitutional Amendment Fails in New Hampshire,
SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO (June 27, 2012), http://schoolfunding.info/news/attempt-to-enact-
constitutional-amendment-fails-in-new-hampshire/ [https://perma.cc/JV4Y-HBBU] (noting
that in New Hampshire, numerous constitutional amendments have been proposed to restrict
judicial review of educational adequacy).
138. Joseph O’Sullivan, Contempt Ruling Ups Ante in Fight to Fund Public Schools, SE-
ATTLE TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/ contempt-
ruling-ups-ante-in-fight-to-fund-public-schools/ [https://perma.cc/P2K5-BMFJ] (“For the first
time in history, the Washington Supreme Court has held the Legislature in contempt for
failing to obey a court order.”).
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court-imposed deadlines to enact remedial legislation.139 In New
Jersey, the game of chicken between court and legislature resulted
in the court ordering all of the state’s schools closed for an eight-day
period.140 State supreme courts in Ohio and Alabama finally capit-
ulated in the face of legislative intransigence.141
This is not to say that judicial involvement in education quality
cases has been fruitless. The precarious judicial-legislative dance
has often resulted in salutary educational and funding reforms. The
best available evidence suggests that judicially induced spending
increases have on average yielded both test-score and lifetime-out-
come gains for students in the benefited districts.142 My point is
simply that when courts deem an education-quality claim justicia-
ble, they embark on an uncertain, highly scrutinized journey, the
ultimate success of which depends on the cooperation of the leg-
islative and executive branches of government—cooperation which
may be difficult for the courts to secure.
The prospect of this journey has been too much for some courts to
stomach. Reviewing the history of school finance litigation in Ar-
kansas, Kansas, Texas, Alabama, and New Jersey, the Nebraska
Supreme Court wrote:
139. See Joseph O’Sullivan & Jim Brunner, School Funding Back on Table as Court Fines
State $100,000 a Day, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.seattletimes.
com/seattle-news/education/supreme-court-orders-100000-per-day-fines-in-mccleary-case/
[https://perma.cc/9CHR-KXP5].
140. See Joe Robertson, Kansas School Shutdown Would Follow New Jersey’s Contentious
Path 40 Years Ago, KAN. CITY STAR (June 8, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/
news/local/article82533292.html [https://perma.cc/4QRQ-RT4W].
141. In Alabama, the capitulation was complete and de jure. See Ex parte James, 836 So.
2d 813, 815 (Ala. 2002) (per curiam) (holding education-clause claims nonjusticiable because
of remedial/separation of powers concerns, notwithstanding a decision of the same court five
years earlier holding these claims reviewable). For a summary of the Alabama litigation, see
Alabama, SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://schoolfunding.info/litigation-map/alabama/ [https://
perma.cc/WQE6-ZPU8]. In Ohio, the supreme court, in its fifth opinion in the same case, held
that the trial court had no authority to supervise crafting of a remedy by the legislature. See
State ex rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V ), 789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003). For a summary of
the Ohio litigation, see Ohio, SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://schoolfunding.info/litigation-map/
ohio/ [https://perma.cc/5JGN-9ATM].
142. See C. Kirabo Jackson et al., The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Econ-
omic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms, 131 Q.J. ECONOMICS 157, 212 (2016);
Julien Lafortune et al., School Finance Reform and the Distribution of Student Achievement
5, 39 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22011, 2016).
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[A] justiciable issue must be susceptible to immediate resolution
and capable of present judicial enforcement. But courts have
been unable to immediately resolve school funding disputes.
....
The landscape is littered with courts that have been bogged
down in the legal quicksand of ... challenges to their states’
school funding systems.... [W]e refuse to wade into that Stygian
swamp.143
And yet, only about a third of the state supreme courts to have faced
the question deemed claims under the education clauses nonjus-
ticiable.144 The rest entered the Stygian swamp and developed
strategies to navigate through it. Perhaps this willingness to engage
reflects the strong representation-reinforcement argument for some
judicial involvement in the education sphere.145 It goes without
saying that similar arguments counsel for some judicial role in
enforcing constitutional values of representational adequacy.
B. Mucking Through the Stygian Swamp: How State Courts Have
Managed Education-Rights Litigation
At the dawn of modern era of education rights litigation, legal
scholars John Coons, William Clune, and Stephen Sugarman argued
that the central challenge was to develop a clear, coherent, and
easy-to-apply doctrinal standard.146 Ad-hocery would “evoke nothing
but criticism of the court and evasion by the legislatures.”147 This is,
of course, the same “manageability” conviction that has thwarted
143. Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 182-83 (Neb.
2007) (footnote omitted).
144. As of 2010, twenty-six state supreme courts had “addressed education finance consti-
tutional challenges at least partly founded on theories of adequacy”; only eight “held that the
courts may not engage in merits review.” Bauries, supra note 85, at 741. The Online Appendix
provides a current, state-by-state summary of nonjusticiability rulings (including lower court
decisions that were not appealed or that the state supreme court elected not to review).
Elmendorf, supra note 5.
145. For a sketch of the argument—emphasizing the status of children as nonvoters, the
lack of political power of the poor, and the normative foundations of the education right in
political as well as economic opportunity—see Elmendorf & Shanske, supra note 71 (manu-
script at 21-22).
146. JOHN E. COONS, WILLIAM H. CLUNE III & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 290-91 (1970).
147. Id.
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partisan gerrymandering litigation. Yet the courts that entered the
Stygian Swamp of education rights litigation largely did not follow
Coons and his colleagues’ directive.148 Instead they developed coping
strategies that allowed them to intervene at opportune moments in
politically delicate disputes. These strategies include (1) combining
opaque, multifactored liability rulings with “legislative remand”
remedies; (2) discovering implied legislative duties to enact a rea-
sonable framework for public education; and (3) issuing provisional
injunctive remedies, which the legislature is free to replace.
1. The Rose Template: Kitchen-Sink Liability Rulings and
Legislative Remand Remedies
Courts have described the education right as entitling students
to a reasonably adequate or roughly equal education,149 thus placing
questions about the quality of the school system front and center.150
Yet instead of constitutionalizing a metric of school quality, courts,
particularly in their early interventions, announced very general
qualitative goals and then found the state liable on the basis of an
open-ended weighing of everything in the record that tended to
make the state’s schools or school system look bad relative to schools
elsewhere. The seminal example is the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
opinion in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.151
The Rose court established loose performance standards such as
“sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students
to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization.”152 But
the court did not identify particular schools or school districts that
were falling short of the standards, or particular state actions that
could bring them up to par. Nor did it set forth a standard of review.
Instead the court just made an open-ended determination about
148. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-
examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185 (2003) (arguing that fuzzy standards rather than clear rules had
carried the day, with courts mixing arguments about equity with arguments about adequacy
and generally providing little guidance about what must be done to achieve constitutional
compliance).
149. See id. at 1193-94.
150. Elmendorf & Shanske, supra note 71 (manuscript at 8-9) (collecting sources).
151. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
152. Id. at 212.
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whether the State was doing a good enough job in the domain of
education, in light of everything in the record.153 Typical factors in
Rose-style opinions include: disparities among states, districts,
schools, or demographic groups in test-score results and graduation
rates (so-called “output” measures of education quality); analogous
disparities in “inputs,” such as funding, teacher salaries, curricula,
facilities, and class sizes; government reports on problems with the
school system; and evidence of legislative inattention to the prob-
lems, sometimes expressed as the legislature’s failure to commission
a study estimating the cost of achieving the state’s educational stan-
dards.154 
Having found the State liable, the Rose court remanded to the
legislature for a remedy.155 This is a way for courts to pressure the
legislature and support reformers without actually resolving any of
the difficult questions about how best to measure the quality of
education being provided to the state’s children, or about which
funding or policy reforms would most likely improve the education
of disadvantaged children. 
153. See id. at 196-99. As the court explained, “The evidence in this case consists of numer-
ous depositions, volumes of oral evidence heard by the trial court, and a seemingly endless
amount of statistical data, reports, etc.... The tidal wave of the appellees’ evidence literally
engulfs that of the appellants.” Id. at 196-97.
154. See, e.g., Op. of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, app. at 126-36 (Ala. 1993) (broad list of
shortcomings); Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 939 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam) (“[O]utputs are
necessary elements of a constitutionally adequate education and must be funded by the
ultimate financing formula adopted by the legislature.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office
of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552-54 (Mass. 1993) (broad list of shortcomings); Abbeville Cty. Sch.
Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 162 (S.C. 2014) (“Plaintiff Districts argue, and we agree, that
the proper question is whether the education funding apparatus as a whole gives rise to a
constitutional violation.”), amended by 777 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. 2015), and superseded by 780
S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 2015); see also James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance
Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1233 (2008) (“Seventeen state courts of last resort have ruled
in favor of school finance plaintiffs since 1989, the advent of the so-called adequacy wave of
cases. If one studies these opinions, an interesting pattern emerges: Time and again, courts
have focused on disparities in funding, curricular and extracurricular offerings, qualified
teachers, school facilities, and instructional materials.” (footnote omitted)).
155. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216. Though concurring and dissenting justices in Rose criticized
the legislative remand remedy as a judicial abdication of responsibility, see id. at 216-18
(Gant, J., concurring), or impermissibly advisory, see id. at 223-25 (Leibson, J., dissenting),
the legislative remand is the now-standard initial remedy in school finance cases. See Koski,
supra note 148, at 1241 (“[I]n all nineteen final state supreme court educational finance
decisions that favored plaintiffs, the courts issued declaratory relief and ordered the leg-
islature to develop a remedial finance scheme.”).
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That so many courts have followed Rose perhaps suggests that
the demand for “manageable standards”—understood as constrain-
ing, determinate rules—is misplaced. Fuzzy standards can be useful
tools for handling politically delicate cases, allowing courts to make
headway when the political stars align, while saving face—back-
tracking without overruling precedent—as may be necessary.156
2. Legislative Duties: Standards, Testing, and Evidentiary
Records
Faced with competing arguments about the quality of the state’s
schools and the likely efficacy of various interventions, some courts
have subtly proceduralized the education right. In these courts,
liability rulings depend less on the absolute quality of the state’s
schools than on whether the state legislature exercised its implied
duty under the constitution to establish a reasonable framework for
implementing the education right.157
This duty, the courts have said, obligates the legislature to
“defin[e] or giv[e] substantive content to ‘basic education,’”158 within
the meaning of the state constitution; to provide for student testing
calibrated to the legislature’s gloss on the constitutional standard;
and to establish accountability mechanisms.159 Several courts have
156. See Koski, supra note 148, at 1296-98.
157. For a defense of this approach, see Elmendorf & Shanske, supra note 71 (manuscript
at 21-25). 
158. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978).
159. See id.; see also Moore v. State, No. 3AN049756, 2007 WL 8310251, at *75-76 (Alaska
Super. Ct. June 21, 2007) (holding that legislature’s constitutional duty has four components:
promulgating “rational educational standards”; establishing “an adequate method of assessing
whether children are actually learning what is set out in the standards”; ensuring “adequate
funding so as to accord schools the abiiity [sic] to provide instruction in the standards”; and
providing for “adequate accountability and oversight”); Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist.
No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 261 (Mont. 2005) (faulting legislature for not defining quality);
Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 995-96 (N.H. 2006) (ordering
legislature to define constitutional standard of quality); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont IV ), 794 A.2d 744, 751-58 (N.H. 2002) (deeming the accountability system
constitutionally inadequate); Abbott V, 710 A.2d 450, 468 (N.J. 1998) (addressing account-
ability systems), clarified, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No.
95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *69 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (reading constitution
to require accountability system), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C.
2004); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II ), 728 N.E.2d 993, 1019-20 (Ohio 2000) (discussing need
for standards and standards-aligned assessment tests); cf. Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822
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also required the legislature to commission a study estimating the
cost of meeting state educational standards, and to enact and justify
a school-funding formula in light of that study.160 The legislature
may not arbitrarily reallocate school funding in response to inter-
est group or local government pressures.161 In short, the legislature
must create a plan to implement the education clauses of the con-
stitution and then put shoulder to the wheel absent some good rea-
son to change course.162
One can understand the legislative-duty cases as an ingenious
response to the lack of a judicially discoverable and manageable
standard of educational quality. Instead of dismissing plaintiffs’
adequacy claims as nonjusticiable, the court tells the legislature to
bring into being a reasonable quality standard, and a framework to
measure and publicize whether that standard is being met.163 This
N.E.2d 1134, 1144 (Mass. 2005) (upholding educational system now that “objective, data-
driven assessments of student performance and specific performance goals ... inform a
standardized education policy and direct the Commonwealth’s public education resources”).
160. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 102 P.3d 1160, 1164 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he finan-
cing formula was not based upon actual costs to educate children but was instead based on
former spending levels and political compromise.”); Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
6, 109 P.3d at 262 (faulting legislature for not “link[ing] the [school funding] formula to any
factors that might constitute a ‘quality’ education”); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I ), 677 N.E.2d
733, 738 (Ohio 1997) (invalidating school-finance system because, inter alia, the “formula
amount” was a “budgetary residual,” rather than an amount determined on the basis of an
estimate of “what it actually costs to educate a pupil”); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter,
91 S.W.3d 232, 234 (Tenn. 2002) (invalidating school-funding formula because it “contains no
mechanism for cost determination or annual cost review of teachers’ salaries”); McCleary v.
State, 269 P.3d 227, 253-57 (Wash. 2012) (finding school-finance system unconstitutional
because legislature had established new performance standards without concurrently
updating the funding rules to reflect those standards); State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 19
P.3d 518, 526 (Wyo.) (ordering legislature to provide for cost studies updated every five years),
modified, 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001).
161. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, No. X07HHDCV14503
7565S, 2016 WL 4922730, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2016).
162. To be clear, the quasi-procedural, legislative-duty theory of liability reflected in the
“framework” decisions is not always clearly distinguished from the more substantive, school-
quality theory of liability manifested in Rose-style opinions. Many of the opinions about
framework duties also include findings about the state’s failure to educate disadvantaged
students effectively. See sources cited supra notes 159-60. It is often unclear whether such
findings serve as flourishes, as triggering conditions for the legislative duty to promulgate a
reasonable framework, or as independent and potentially ongoing bases for liability insofar
as the framework fails to generate better outcomes.
163. See, e.g., Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12, 907 A.2d at 993 (invalidating legislative
response to prior judicial decision requiring legislature to define educational adequacy be-
cause “under the statutory scheme there is no way a citizen or a school district in this State
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sets up the court to decide future educational adequacy cases on a
more principled basis. The court will be able to apply standards the
legislature has promulgated, using data the legislature has required
school districts to collect.164
The requirement of a record-justified funding formula also greatly
eases judicial review of school finance decisions. Rather than resolv-
ing difficult first-order disputes about whether more money, some-
how distributed, would materially improve the plaintiffs’ schools,
the court can revert to familiar administrative law modalities of
review: Did the legislature165 consider a reasonable range of funding
alternatives, and explain the chosen formula in light of its own edu-
cational standards and the evidence in the record?166
To be clear, the quasi-procedural, legislative-duty theory of
liability that this Section has described is, in practice, not fully
distinct from the schools-are-not-good-enough theory of liability
can determine the distinct substantive content of a constitutionally adequate education,” thus
leaving the system “impervious to meaningful judicial review”).
164. Or so one might reasonably hope. Scott Bauries has questioned whether legislated
educational standards are sufficiently concrete and realistic to determine outcomes in cases
under the education clauses. See Bauries, supra note 85, at 722-24. But see Gannon v. State,
319 P.3d 1196, 1236-37 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam) (“[A]dequacy ... is met when the public edu-
cation financing system ... is reasonably calculated to have all Kansas public education stu-
dents meet or exceed the standards ... presently codified in K.S.A.2013 Supp. 72-1127.”); Hoke
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 2000 WL 1639686, at *87 (“[T]he [state’s] standard of [educational] perfor-
mance now in place may not be lowered.”); see also Benjamin Michael Superfine, Deciding
Who Decides Questions at the Intersection of School Finance Reform Litigation and Standards-
Based Accountability Policies, 23 EDUC. POL’Y 480, 490-500 (2009) (discussing other cases in
which courts treated state educational standards as a guidepost in determining constitutional
adequacy of the school system).
165. Or the legislature’s delegate. Some states, such as Oregon, have charged admin-
istrative agencies with the development of school-funding formulas. See JOINT SPECIAL COMM.
ON PUB. EDUC. APPROPRIATION, REPORT ON ADEQUACY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING AS
REQUIRED BY ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 8, OF THE OREGON CONSTITUTION 3 (2016) (describing
formation and goals of Oregon Quality Education Commission).
166. See, e.g., Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 262
(Mont. 2005) (faulting legislature for “not link[ing] the [school-funding] formula to any factors
that might constitute a ‘quality’ education”). For more on the similarities between judicial
review under the education clauses and judicial review under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, see Elmendorf & Shanske, supra note 71 (manuscript at 23-24); see also Abbott
v. Burke (Abbott IV ), 693 A.2d 417, 437 (N.J. 1997) (“The State contends that experts were
involved in formulating the amounts of [funding] and that the Court should defer to their
determinations.... We are unwilling ... to accede to putative expert opinion that does not
disclose the reasons or bases for its conclusions.”).
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manifested in Rose-style opinions.167 Many of the courts that ar-
ticulated legislative duties also made findings about the state’s
167. Perhaps the purest illustration of the quasi-procedural/legislative-duty theory is the
line of decisions from New Hampshire’s supreme court, which consistently declined to pass
on the constitutional sufficiency of school quality while insisting that the legislature
promulgate clear standards and a system of testing that would enable the court and other
observers to ascertain whether the standards are being met. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993) (holding that the state constitution
“imposes a duty on the State to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every
educable child ... and to guarantee adequate funding,” and remanding for trial); Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1354, 1357-58 (N.H. 1997) (clarifying
legislative duty to promulgate standards, and finding a constitutional flaw in the tax system,
while declining to reach district court’s conclusion that school quality was inadequate under
any of the several possible standards); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont III), 744
A.2d 1107, 1108-09 (N.H. 1999) (addressing revised tax system while again deferring decision
on school quality); Claremont IV, 794 A.2d 744, 759-60 (N.H. 2002) (finding accountability
system constitutionally inadequate while deferring decision on quality); Londonderry Sch.
Dist. SAU No. 12, 907 A.2d at 993-96 (ordering the legislature to define a constitutional stan-
dard of quality and threatening appointment of a special master to make said determination
if the legislature continues to fail to do so).
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failure to effectively educate disadvantaged students.168 These find-
ings may represent an independent basis for liability.169
3. Provisional Injunctive Remedies
The legislative remand has become the standard remedy for
violations of the education clauses.170 But what happens next if the
legislature does nothing or issues a wholly inadequate response? In
most states this question has not been squarely met, because the
legislature did respond and the court gave substantial deference to
168. See, e.g., Moore v. State, No. 3AN049756, 2007 WL 8310251, at *75-76 (Alaska Super.
Ct. June 21, 2007) (providing abstract, seemingly non-record-specific statement of what the
education clauses require in terms of legislated standards, testing, and accountability sys-
tems—but only after discussing persistent, intergenerational failure of state to educate cer-
tain populations of students); Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Ariz. 1997) (finding
the legislation unconstitutional because it both created substantial facilities funding dispari-
ties between school districts and failed to establish minimum adequacy standards for such
funding); Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6, 109 P.3d at 262-63 (holding that legis-
lature must define “quality” and tie school funding to legislated definition of quality, and then
reciting the district court’s findings about educational problems and stating that current
funding levels are insufficient); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95, 102-03
(Wash. 1978) (holding that the legislature failed “to comply with its constitutional duty [to]
defin[e] and giv[e] substantive meaning to [the constitutional term ‘basic education’]” and
sustaining the trial court’s conclusion that school funding was inadequate under any of three
possible definitions of that term).
In some states, an initial Rose-style opinion finding the state liable for the poor education
provided in certain schools or school districts has been followed by an opinion cast more in
terms of legislative duties. Compare DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733, 742-45 (Ohio 1997) (finding
the state liable after canvassing deteriorated physical facilities, lack of instructional materi-
als, limited curricular offerings, poor access to technology, and poor test scores in focal school
districts), with DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1018-20 (Ohio 2000) (finding the state liable for
inadequate articulation of standards, inadequate accountability system, and ongoing failure
to link funding to standards), McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,
552-53 (Mass. 1993) (finding the state liable on the basis of holistic comparison of educational
inputs/outputs in plaintiff districts and more affluent “‘comparison’ districts”), and Hancock
v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1151-56 (Mass. 2005) (acknowledging continuing and
“profound” educational failures, but ruling against the plaintiffs because the state had
established a comprehensive system of standards, testing, funding, and accountability, was
making some progress, and could no longer be said to be “neglecting” its constitutional duty).
169. Under the first interpretation, the state would remain liable so long as student perfor-
mance and other indicia of “quality” fell below the level that the court deemed constitutionally
acceptable. Under the second interpretation, the state could escape liability by establishing
performance standards, a reasonable funding system calibrated to those standards, and a
reasonable accountability system.
170. See Koski, supra note 148, at 1241.
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the legislature’s fix.171 But where the question has been faced, we
see two emergent patterns. First, a number of courts have ramped
up pressure on the legislature with deadlines backed by penalty
defaults.172 These courts require legislative action by a specified date
and threaten either to hold the legislature in contempt or to shut
down all public schools in the state if the deadline is not met.173 The
deadline or deadline-plus-penalty remedy often emerges from a spe-
cific conception of the separation of powers. The animating idea is
that when there are multiple ways to achieve constitutional compli-
ance, it is for the political branches, not the courts, to choose the
path forward.174
The other remedial strategy is to appoint a special master or ex-
pert panel with broad authority over constitutionally inadequate
schools or school districts. The leading example is the Abbott line of
cases from New Jersey.175 Seven years after its initial liability
171. As Koski observes, “[S]tate supreme courts have recognized their institutional limita-
tions and paid significant deference to the legislative and executive branches.” Id. at 1188. Yet
research showing that state court rulings in the adequacy cases have led states to increase
spending on the schools, and to allocate that spending in ways that substantially benefit dis-
advantaged students, demonstrates that legislatures generally do respond— productively—to
judicial findings of liability. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
172. This is an unusual constitutional remedy but not without precedent. For other exam-
ples, see John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 845-50 (2006) (illustrating a concept of penalty de-
faults in constitutional law with the release of prisoners in habeas cases and exclusion of
evidence obtained without a warrant).
173. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
174. See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 258-61 (Wash. 2012). For academic papers devel-
oping these ideas, see Bauries, supra note 85, at 721-33 (reviewing literature and concluding
that “[s]cholars have ... reached a rough consensus that, once the merits [of an adequacy case]
are adjudicated, courts should abstain from ordering or compelling any specific, judge-made
remedial measures, but should instead engage in dialog with the coordinate branches to
encourage reform”); and Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State
School Finance Litigation, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 594-96 (2004) (arguing on separa-
tion of powers grounds that courts in educational adequacy cases should issue no remedy
beyond a declaration of unconstitutionality).
175. Other examples include Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 144 S.W.3d 741
(Ark. 2004) (per curiam) (order appointing special masters); Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No.
12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 995-96 (N.H. 2006) (stating that if the legislature fails to establish
a reasonable precise, measureable definition of adequacy, the court may invalidate the
existing funding system and/or appoint a special master “to aid in the determination of the
definition of a constitutionally adequate education”); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 777
S.E.2d 547 (S.C.) (remedial order prescribing a three-person expert panel to evaluate the
state’s proposed remedy, to be reviewed by the court de novo), superseded by 780 S.E.2d 609
(S.C. 2015). There are also a few cases in which courts trying to remedy a constitutional
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ruling, and following its rejection of legislative responses, the New
Jersey Supreme Court “found that the continuing constitutional
deprivation had persisted too long and clearly necessitated a
remedy.”176 The court issued an “interim remedy” of “parity fund-
ing,” resourcing the Abbott districts at the average level of an ident-
ified set of rich, suburban districts.177 The court also authorized the
trial judge to appoint a special master and told the State’s Commis-
sioner of Education to submit a plan to the trial court for improving
education in the Abbott districts.178
The trial court then appointed a professor of education to serve as
special master.179 The professor and the State’s Commissioner of
Education developed a detailed school-reform plan, which the court
put into effect.180 Importantly, the New Jersey Supreme Court indi-
cated that the constitution did not require these particular reme-
dies. Parity of funding with suburban districts, the court said, “can
... be understood in the nature of provisional or interim relief.”181
This remedy would be “mooted” if the State demonstrated that fund-
ing at some lesser level would suffice to achieve a “thorough and
efficient education” in the Abbott districts, or if the State identified
“genuine inefficiencies or excesses” in the Abbott districts’ use of
state funds.182
Like the penalty default used in some other states, the provision-
al injunctive remedy honors the political branches’ primacy in the
domain of education. New Jersey’s constitution requires the Abbott
schools to be decent schools. It is indifferent between various ways
of making them decent. If New Jersey’s legislature or education
violation go deep into the weeds of educational policy making without appointing a special
master. See Benjamin Michael Superfine, New Directions in School Funding and Governance:
Moving from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY. L.J. 653, 668 (2010) (citing and discussing cases).
176. Abbott V, 710 A.2d 450, 456 (N.J. 1998) (referring to Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J.
1997)), clarified by 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000).
177. See Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 439 (N.J. 1997).
178. See id. at 444-45. This remedial directive is succinctly summarized in the court’s next
Abbott opinion. See Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 456.
179. Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 456.
180. See id. at 456-57.
181. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 442. To borrow John Ferejohn and Barry Friedman’s terminol-
ogy, this provisional remedy is a model default rule—one which the legislature may alter, but
which the court believes to be well crafted to achieve constitutional compliance. See Ferejohn
& Friedman, supra note 172, at 850-53.
182. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 442.
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department develops a different reasonable vision for how to make
the Abbott schools decent, they are free to pursue it.
III. TOWARD REPRESENTATIONAL ADEQUACY CLAIMS UNDER STATE
AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS
Part I of this Article argued that a legal strategy for attacking
partisan gerrymanders should aim to (1) unravel the manageability
knot that has confounded litigation to date under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause (the judicially discoverable standards are thought to be
unmanageable, and the judicially manageable standards undiscov-
erable); (2) deter or remedy responsiveness-harming bipartisan
gerrymanders; and, insofar as the strategy targets congressional
gerrymanders, (3) answer the distinctive justiciability concerns
associated with disaggregated redistricting.
This Part argues that these goals can be realized by finding in the
relevant constitution an implied legislative duty to promulgate a
redistricting framework addressed to the overall adequacy of rep-
resentation. (The relevant constitution is the state constitution for
cases about gerrymanders of the statehouse; for cases about
congressional districts, it is the U.S. Constitution.183 ) I shall call this
the representational adequacy/legislative duty approach. Developed
with reference to the education cases, the strategy relies on a quasi-
procedural theory of liability, a legislative remand remedy, and the
threat of provisional judge-made standards should the legislature
fail to remediate the constitutional violation. Section A describes the
strategy; Section B argues that changed conditions warrant judicial
recognition of the legislative duty; Section C explains how the
strategy resolves the problems surveyed in Part I; Section D con-
siders the textual basis for it; and Section E responds to objections.
183. Because the harms from a congressional gerrymander in one state depend on how
other state’s congressional districts are drawn, see supra Part I.C, the criteria for congres-
sional districting need to be established at the national level and thus by Congress or the U.S.
Constitution (not a given state’s constitution).
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A. A Sketch of the Idea
The premise of the representational adequacy/legislative duty
approach is that there exists an implied constitutional duty for the
legislature to act reasonably, in furtherance of basic democratic
norms, in drawing or overseeing the drawing of legislative districts.
What this duty of care entails depends on substantive democratic
norms, such as majoritarianism and responsiveness, the available
technology for advancing or thwarting those norms, voter prefer-
ences, and spatial patterns in the distribution of voters. The entail-
ments of the legislative duty therefore vary over time, as technology
develops and citizens sort themselves into geographic communities.
Several generations ago, no one imagined that state courts would
find in the education clauses of their constitutions an implied legis-
lative duty to create reasonably precise educational content stan-
dards, a system of testing calibrated to those standards, and an
associated school-funding formula justified on the basis of an evi-
dentiary record.184 But as education became ever more important for
socioeconomic mobility, and as technologies for measuring educa-
tional attainment improved, courts began to recognize constitutional
limits on legislative discretion with respect to the provision of
education.185 Similar developments should inform judicial interpre-
tation of generally worded constitutional provisions about electoral
districts, electoral integrity, and the time, place, and manner of
elections. Just as courts have held that the legislature, in “providing
for” a system of public schools, must establish reasonably clear
184. Regarding understandings of the education clauses at different points in history, see
generally John Dinan, The Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence from
the Constitutional Convention Debates, 70 ALB. L. REV. 927 (2007); and John C. Eastman,
When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State Constitutional Provisions
for Education 1776-1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1998).
185. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass.
1993) (“The content of the duty to educate which the Constitution places on the Common-
wealth necessarily will evolve together with our society.”); Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359
(N.H. 1997) (“Mere competence in the basics—reading, writing, and arithmetic—is insufficient
in the waning days of the twentieth century to insure that this State’s public school students
are fully integrated into the world around them.” (emphasis added)); Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978) (“We cannot ignore the fact that times have changed
and that [education] which may have been ‘ample’ in 1889 may be wholly unsuited for
children confronted with contemporary demands wholly unknown to the constitutional
convention.”).
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objectives for the school system, measure whether those objectives
are being realized, and set up a corrective process for schools or
school districts that fall short,186 so too may courts find in the
representation clauses of the relevant constitution an implied
legislative duty to establish a reasonable framework for partisan/
ideological fairness and responsiveness in districting and for cor-
recting district maps that fall short of the standards.
A court ruling on the existence of this legislative duty might
sketch general guidelines for redistricting criteria, but the court
would leave the details to be worked out in the future. As in the
education cases, the initial remedy would be a legislative remand.
The redistricting framework developed by the legislature on remand
would govern judicial review of partisan fairness and respon-
siveness claims going forward—provided that the framework is
substantively reasonable and sufficiently determinate for judicial
application in politically sensitive cases.
What happens if the legislature does nothing or issues a wholly
inadequate response to the initial judicial ruling? The education
cases foreground two possibilities. As noted above, some state courts
have held on separation of powers ground that they lack authority
to make the discretionary choice among potential educational reme-
dies.187 Occasionally these courts have fined intransigent legisla-
tures, or have ordered or threatened a temporary shutdown of the
schools.188 In representational adequacy cases, a court operating
under this conception of the separation of powers might fine the
legislature for failing to adopt a reasonable framework for redistrict-
ing. But the court would not pass on the adequacy of district maps
unless or until the legislature establishes suitable criteria for judi-
cial review.
The other, and to my mind more attractive, response to legislative
intransigence is to follow the path of the New Jersey courts in the
Abbott litigation.189 After many years of inadequate legislative re-
sponses, the trial court finally appointed a professor of education as
special master to develop programs and funding procedures for the
186. See supra Part II.B.
187. See supra Part II.A.4.
188. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
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Abbott school districts.190 All the while, the courts made clear that
these programmatic and funding remedies were provisional, subject
to displacement if and when the State developed a decent plan for
the Abbott districts.191
In the representational adequacy setting, courts issuing provi-
sional remedies might prescribe a metric of partisan bias and an
upper limit. The court might also adopt a metric of competitiveness
and set a target proportion of competitive seats. In cases about
Congress, the provisional relief would include a protocol for deter-
mining which state’s congressional districts would be judicially
redistricted in the event of a violation.192 These measures would
govern subsequent representational adequacy litigation until such
time as the appropriate legislature adopts a reasonable framework
for districting and judicial review.
Though some critics have portrayed the Abbott litigation as a
horror story of judicial micromanagement,193 it should be clear that
analogous provisional remedies for representational inadequacy
would not be nearly as intrusive. The management of high-poverty
school districts is an ongoing process, and once the courts held that
New Jersey had to provide for the particularized needs of impover-
ished children in the Abbott districts, it was inevitable that school
administrators would return to court again and again with new
ideas for how to better serve those needs. In the redistricting con-
text, by contrast, the provisional remedy need only establish a cou-
ple of reasonably clear-cut benchmarks, compliance with which
would be litigated once a decade.194
B. Changed Conditions
In the previous Section, I suggested that much as changes in the
value of education and in state capacity to provide and monitor
190. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
192. Cf. supra Part I.C (discussing the problem of remedial discretion owing to disaggre-
gated redistricting of Congress).
193. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) (“The volume of
litigation and the extent of judicial oversight [in the Abbott cases] provide a chilling example
of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the duties of a Legislature.”).
194. To preclude more frequent litigation, the court might establish a per se rule against
mid-decade redistricting, as some courts have done already. See infra Part III.E.1.
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educational systems (arguably) altered what the duty of care re-
quires of legislatures in this domain, so too may changes in rep-
resentation and redistricting obligate legislatures to establish new
frameworks for districting, including meaningful standards and
accountability systems. It is worth considering these changes in
some detail. Because representational adequacy/legislative duty
claims would not, in general, draw upon clearly directive consti-
tutional text or a constitutional tradition of legislative self-limita-
tion in districting, arguments from changed conditions invariably
loom large. Two recent changes are particularly important.
The first is the development by political scientists, statisticians,
and law professors of various quantitative metrics of legislative
maps’ partisan or ideological bias and the competitiveness of leg-
islative seats. While rudimentary measures of partisan bias and
competitiveness have been available for decades,195 there has been
an explosion of recent work in this area, with a number of scholars
developing metrics of partisan fairness that are easily implemented
with open-source software.196 Several decades ago, it might have
been reasonable to argue that legislators had no duty to establish
judicially enforceable limits on biased maps of legislative districts
because enforcement of those limits would have been so discretion-
ary, inviting judges to substitute their preferences with respect to
particular maps for the legislature’s. Today that argument is a
nonstarter, now that a menu of easily implemented and potentially
bright-line standards exists for legislatures to choose among.
The second and equally important development is the emergence
of data vendors that use public and commercial datasets to estimate
partisan “support scores” and turnout propensities for every regis-
tered voter.197 Piggybacking on newly digitized state voter files, the
Democratic and Republican National Committees began construct-
ing national electronic voter registries in the mid-2000s, and private
firms such as Catalist entered the field as well.198 The resulting
195. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Measures of Bias and Proportionality in Seats-Votes Rela-
tionships, 9 POL. METHODOLOGY 295 (1983); Edward R. Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats
and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 540 (1973). 
196. For prominent examples, see sources cited supra note 40.
197. See generally EITAN D. HERSH, HACKING THE ELECTORATE: HOW CAMPAIGNS PER-
CEIVE VOTERS (2015); David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Political Campaigns and Big Data,
28 J. ECON. PERSP. 51 (2014).
198. See HERSH, supra note 197, at 66-69. Catalist, now a leading liberal-side firm, started
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databases combine individual-level voter histories and demograph-
ics from state voter files, individual-level records of campaign
contacts and donations, block-level data from the census, and,
frequently, individual-level data from consumer databases.199 These
datasets have made it possible for campaigns to generate or pur-
chase predictions for each registered voter of the probability that the
voter will turn out in an election, support a particular candidate or
political party, give money, or respond in a specified fashion to a
campaign communication.200 As a shorthand, I will refer to the voter
file supplemented with behavioral and political-preference predic-
tions as the “augmented voter file.”
Writing in 2014, political scientists and campaign consultants
David Nickerson and Todd Rogers reported that many campaigns
were generating support scores and turnout propensities using rudi-
mentary statistical models “taught in standard undergraduate ...
classes.”201 More sophisticated actors were beginning to apply the
machine-learning tools used by the private sector in marketing and
other predictive-analytics applications.202 As the augmented voter
file grows with each successive campaign (merging in more records
of campaign contacts and voter behavior), and as statisticians and
computer scientists develop ever more powerful tools for machine
learning with big data, the partisan-preference and turnout pre-
dictions are sure to improve.
Why does this matter for districting? The answer follows from an
important 2008 paper by John Friedman and Richard Holden.203
Friedman and Holden showed that the optimal strategy for a polit-
ical party that controls redistricting depends on what the redistric-
ters know about the political preferences of individual voters.204 If
voter preferences can be observed, and voters placed on a continuum
from strong Republican (or extreme conservative) to strong Demo-
working closely with the Democratic Party in 2006. Id. at 68.
199. See Nickerson & Rogers, supra note 197, at 55-58.
200. See HERSH, supra note 197, at 72-73; Nickerson & Rogers, supra note 197, at 58-59.
201. Nickerson & Rogers, supra note 197, at 59.
202. See id. at 60-61.
203. See Friedman & Holden, supra note 51.
204. Compare Friedman & Holden, supra note 51, at 115 (establishing optimal strategy un-
der the assumption that voter preferences are observable), with Gul & Pesendorfer, supra
note 51, at 1616-17 (showing contrary results for a world in which redistricters cannot observe
individual voter preferences).
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crat (or extreme liberal), then the politically optimal strategy is to
create districts composed of “matched slices” of the elector-
ate—strong Republicans paired with strong Democrats, center-right
Republicans paired with center-left Democrats, and so forth.205
When Democrats control redistricting, the Democratic “slice” in as
many districts as possible will be slightly larger than the Republi-
can slice; when Republicans run the show, the opposite will be true.
The core idea is to neutralize the opposing party’s most reliable
voters by combining them in a district with a slight majority of the
redistricting party’s most reliable voters.206
The augmented, geocoded voter file—with party support scores
and turnout propensities for each registered voter—is precisely
what redistricters need to implement matched-slice gerrymanders.
It will be a game changer. To see why, consider how partisan ger-
rymanders were effected after the 2010 census, before anyone had
figured out how to exploit augmented voter files for districting. We
know something about gerrymandering techniques in the 2010
round of redistricting from the claims currently being litigated. The
picture is most complete with respect to Wisconsin, as only Whitford
v. Gill has gone to trial, but court filings in Shapiro v. McManus and
League of Women Voters v. Rucho suggest that partisan gerryman-
ders were executed similarly in North Carolina and Maryland.207
205. See Friedman & Holden, supra note 51, at 115.
206. See id.
207. In North Carolina, as in Wisconsin, redistricters proxied the partisan strength of a
district using the statewide vote for Republican candidates in recent elections. See Complaint,
supra note 21, at 14 (quoting the following instruction from Republican legislators in charge
of the redistricting process: “The only data other than population data to be used to construct
congressional districts shall be election results in statewide contests since January 1, 2008, not
including the last two presidential contests.” (emphasis added)).
In Maryland, plaintiffs challenging a Democratic partisan gerrymander claim that the re-
districters were provided with the state Board of Election’s voter file, with “highly detailed
geographic information about voter registration, party affiliation, and voter turnout across
the State.” Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 586 (D. Md. 2016) (quoting the Com-
plaint). But there was no allegation that the redistricters had access to or used partisan-
support or turnout-propensity scores. Rather, Democrats implemented the gerrymander
simply by shifting a large number of registered Republicans out of the target district and
replacing them with a large number of registered Democrats. See id. at 587.
Kareem Crayton reports that in some states, some interested parties did purchase augmen-
ted voter files and used them to draft or evaluate maps, but the practice was not common, and
the predictions were probably of much lower quality than the predictions will be in 2020 (with
better models and more years of voter behavior in the file). Interview with Kareem Crayton,
Managing Partner, Crimcard Consulting Services, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16, 2016).
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The actors who created Wisconsin’s notorious partisan gerryman-
der were not craftily matching slices of strong Democrats and strong
Republicans. Rather, they treated ward-level results from 2004-
2010 statewide races as a rough proxy for the expected, ward-level
vote share of a state assembly candidate in an open-seat race.208
They aggregated these expected vote shares within legislative dis-
tricts, and on this basis rated proposed districts as “Safe,” “Lean,”
or “Swing” for each party.209
This approach treats as interchangeable any ward in which the
Republican candidate won (on average) a given percentage of the
vote in recent statewide elections. But some such wards are likely
to perform quite differently than other such wards in legislative
elections in the future. One reason is demographic change: the
Republican-preferring share of the ward’s voting-eligible population
could be rising or falling over time. Another and probably more
important issue is that a ward composed of, say, 55 percent “weak
Republicans” and 45 percent “weak Democrats” is likely to yield
about the same average vote share for Republican candidates in
statewide elections as a ward composed of 55 percent “strong Re-
publicans” and 45 percent “strong Democrats,” yet these wards will
perform very differently in elections where one candidate is an in-
cumbent, or otherwise unusually strong or weak, and also in years
in which the Republican party brand is unusually strong or weak.
The Republican vote share in the ward composed of weak partisans
will be much more volatile. A matched-slice gerrymander would
account for this variation, but the political scientist who advised the
Wisconsin redistricters had no individual-level data on partisan
reliability. He evaluated the robustness of the Republican advan-
tage in proposed maps by “shift[ing] the vote share of each district
ten points [from the predicted level] in either direction,” and calcu-
lating the number of seats that Republicans would win under these
scenarios.210 He made no effort to account for systematic differences
in the likelihood that a voter, or a ward, would “swing” with the
tide. To be clear, this was not a failure on the consultant’s part. As
the plaintiff ’s expert in Whitford v. Gill attested, the Republicans’
208. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 848 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court),
argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
209. Id. at 849-50.
210. Id. at 892.
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consultant used standard methods—indeed the same methods that
the plaintiff ’s expert would use to construct and evaluate the map
he submitted to the court.211
Sophisticated partisan gerrymanders after the 2020 census are
likely to be carried out quite differently. Using augmented voter
files, it will be possible to group voters into “slices” by party support
score and turnout propensity, and to calculate the distribution of
voter types in each proposed district. Though analysts have had
some difficulty creating accurate predictions from data in the aug-
mented voter files about who is likely to be a swing voter (as op-
posed to a hard-to-classify strong partisan),212 it will be easy enough
to distinguish strong partisans from ambiguously classified voters,
and to match slices of strong partisans. It will also be feasible to
create much more realistic simulations of the distribution of voter
turnout across legislative districts in high-turnout and low-turnout
elections (using individual-level data on turnout propensities), and
of the geographic distribution of partisan swings in “good” or “bad”
years for a political party (by assuming not a uniform swing but a
swing concentrated among voters classified as weak partisans).
Absent legal or political constraints, the theoretical world conjured
by Friedman and Holden will become our reality.213
Though the changed-conditions case for a legislative duty to
promulgate redistricting standards is largely about technology, two
further considerations may deserve some weight.
First, a growing body of work on political geography has made
clear that in some states, the distribution of voters results in highly
asymmetric gerrymandering opportunities.214 When one party’s
211. See id. at 847.
212. See HERSH, supra note 197, at 166.
213. Rebecca Green wonders whether the failure of quantitative prognosticators to predict
the outcome of the 2016 presidential election will make redistricters reluctant to rely on the
augmented voter file in the 2020 redistricting. Interview with Rebecca Green, Professor of the
Practice of Law, William & Mary Law School, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16, 2016). I doubt it.
Data acquired during and after the 2016 presidential election is likely to prove very useful for
distinguishing reliable partisans from potential swing voters, as President Donald Trump
appears to have dramatically underperformed with certain Republican demographic groups
and dramatically overperformed with certain Democratic demographic groups. See, e.g., Nate
Silver, Education, Not Income, Predicted Who Would Vote for Trump, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov.
22, 2016, 2:53 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/education-not-income-predicted-who-
would-vote-for-trump/ [https://perma.cc/M7GC-AUVS].
214. See, e.g., Chen & Rodden, supra note 38; cf. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 100-21
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supporters are more geographically clustered than the other party’s
voters, intentional gerrymanders by the less clustered party result
in extraordinary levels of bias, whereas gerrymanders by the more
clustered party may achieve little more than an unbiased map.215
Under these conditions, it may also be particularly difficult to build
a political consensus to limit partisan bias.
However, at the present time, it is not easy to make a strong
changed-conditions argument based on political geography in the
nation as a whole. The idea that political geography matters for
gerrymandering and that liberals are inefficiently distributed is not
new.216 And despite much popular and academic attention to the
“partisan sort” playing out in our nation as a whole, there is actually
little evidence that the sorting of voters into politically like-minded
territorial communities is systematically advantaging Republicans
relative to Democrats in the nation as a whole.217 Compact-district
simulations conducted by Jowei Chen and David Cottrell suggest
that Republicans following the 2010 round of redistricting would
most likely win almost exactly half of the congressional districts
drawn by a computer—not the large majorities implied by the
(acknowledging that geographic distribution creates gerrymandering opportunities but argu-
ing that political choice is still critical).
215. See MCGANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 104-06 (using Illinois as an example of a state
where, because of political geography, intentional Democratic gerrymandering achieved only
an unbiased map); id. at 115-16 (acknowledging that in states such as Pennsylvania, where
Democratic voters are concentrated in a few urban areas, it is relatively easy to create maps
with strong pro-Republican bias).
216. For an early paper on the subject, see Robert S. Erikson, Malapportionment, Gerry-
mandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1234 (1972).
217. The sorting of voters into politically like-minded territorial communities could, in
principle, advantage either party or no party, depending on which voters are moving or chan-
ging their political preferences. See MCGANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 118-19. Empirically,
McGann and his colleagues find a net decrease in Democratic concentration at the county level
between 2000 and 2010, suggesting that, if anything, pro-Republican gerrymanders are be-
coming harder, not easier, to create. Id. at 119-21. (Note, though, that the authors’ choice of
counties as a geographic unit for assessing skewness in partisan geography is rather ar-
bitrary, because there is no requirement that electoral districts be drawn around county
boundaries.) Simon Jackman’s analysis of the “efficiency gap” in state legislative maps in the
post-Reynolds era does show a trend toward greater pro-Republican bias. See Complaint,
supra note 34, Exhibit 3 at 44-48. It does not, however, distinguish “population sorting” from
“intentional gerrymandering” explanations for this trend. McGann and his colleagues find
much greater pro-Republican bias in congressional district maps following the 2010 round of
redistricting, as compared to the 2000 round, but attribute most of the difference to politics,
not geography. See MCGANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 173-76.
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inefficient-clustering-of-liberals hypothesis.218 In sum, evidence of
inefficient clustering may bolster the case for a legislative duty to
promulgate standards with respect to state legislatures in certain
states, but it does not add much to the case for a congressional duty
to promulgate standards with respect to congressional districts.
The other consideration, which does bear on congressional duties,
is the unusual present-day dominance of the Republican Party in
state government. In the wake of the 2016 elections, twenty-six
states are under unified Republican control, as compared to six
states under unified Democratic control.219 If this pattern persists
through 2020, it means that Democratic and Republican gerryman-
ders of congressional district maps are unlikely to offset one another
in the aggregate. There will be systematic pro-Republican bias,
probably exacerbating the pro-Republican bias that has existed
since the 2010 round of redistricting.220 Moreover, the Supreme
218. See Chen & Cottrell, supra note 38, at 336-39, 339 fig.7 (noting the very symmetrical
distribution of predicted Republican victory probabilities).
Bear in mind that the algorithm used in Chen and Cottrell’s study (and most other “auto-
mated redistricting” exercises) does not actually sample, even approximately, from the under-
lying distribution of potential districting maps with a specified degree of compactness. Cf.
Fifield et al., supra note 40 (manuscript at 17-21) (introducing a new algorithm and showing
limits of previous methods with a simple, hypothetical example in which the universe of po-
tential plans can be enumerated—something which cannot be done with real-world examples).
219. See State Government Trifectas, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_ govern
ment_trifectas [https://perma.cc/E8DR-D7D4].
220. Scholars using different methods have come to different conclusions about the degree
of pro-Republican bias in the post-2010 congressional map, but the different methods con-
sistently show some bias toward Republicans. Compare MCGANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 70-
73 (finding that 2010 round of redistricting increased pro-Republican bias in the aggregate
map of congressional districts from roughly 3 percent to 9 percent), with Chen & Cottrell,
supra note 38, at 336-38 (finding that the 2010 aggregate map in expectation awarded Repub-
licans one more seat in the House of Representatives than they probably would have won
under computer-generated maps of compact districts). In 2012, Republicans won a majority
of the seats in the House of Representatives even though Republican candidates for the House
received 1.5 million fewer votes than Democratic candidates. Michael P. McDonald, Geo-
graphy Does Not Necessarily Lead to Pro-Republican Gerrymandering, HUFFINGTON POST: THE
BLOG (July 1, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/ geography-
does-not-necess_b_3530099.html [https://perma.cc/FR3G-JK6R]. In 2016, Trump lost the pop-
ular vote to Hillary Clinton by about 2 percentage points, Nora Kelly, Hillary Clinton’s Lead
Is Greater than Multiple Former Presidents,’ ATLANTIC (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/clinton-vote-lead/508667/ [https://perma.cc/6JWF-XTRB],
but won the median congressional district by more than 3.5 percentage points, Nate Silver
(@NateSilver538), TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://twitter.com/NateSilver538/status/
822917985388138498 [https://perma.cc/DA4U-Z9M2].
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Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which enjoined enforce-
ment of the preclearance regime of the Voting Rights Act,221 re-
moved a substantial constraint on pro-Republican gerrymanders in
the South.222 There is, then, an exceptional risk of pro-Republican
bias in the aggregate map of congressional districts following the
2020 redistricting. (Whether risks specific to a particular round of
redistricting ought to weigh heavily in judicial conclusions about
legislative duties is, of course, a question on which reasonable peo-
ple may disagree.223)
To summarize, there is a decent but not unassailable changed-
conditions argument that the legislative duty to act reasonably with
respect to districting now requires the promulgation of partisan fair-
ness and responsiveness standards. However, because much of the
argument turns on the existence of data and technology that have
not yet been exploited for redistricting, a judge might take a wait-
and-see approach, declining to require standards until such time as
this data is exploited and the consequences become apparent, most
likely after the 2020 round of districting.224
C. The Three Difficulties, Reconsidered
I began this Article by outlining three problems with partisan
gerrymandering claims under the Equal Protection Clause.225 Let us
now consider how the representational adequacy/legislative duty
approach responds to them.
221. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
222. Nick Stephanopoulos estimates that as many as one-third of the electoral districts in
the South where the minority community has the “ability to elect” a Black or Latino repre-
sentative (almost certain to be Democratic districts) are not protected by section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, though they were protected by section 5. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55, 87-96. Redistricting simulations
indicate that the section 5 preclearance regime was also an important constraint on pro-
Republican gerrymanders, see Chen & Cottrell, supra note 38, at 336, as does the theoretical
argument developed in Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan
Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (2011).
223. But note that the 2010 round of congressional districting also resulted in pro-
Republican bias. See MCGANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 174.
224. Cf. Altman & McDonald, supra note 40, at 72 (“Each decadal redistricting since 1960
brought with it tremendous advances in computing technology and repeated promises of
electoral salvation by computer.”).
225. See supra Part I.
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Bipartisan Lockups? The approach I have sketched is unlikely to
induce a spate of bipartisan gerrymanders, because the adequacy
theory just as readily supports legal attacks on responsiveness-
damaging bipartisan gerrymanders as it does attacks on one-party
gerrymanders that result in gross asymmetries in the translation of
votes into representation. This is so because, in most cases, the
judicial decisions about whether legislated representational ade-
quacy criteria are constitutionally sufficient would be grounded on
general electoral integrity and fairness provisions, rather than on
provisions of the constitutional text that narrowly target partisan-
ship in redistricting. (As Part II.A.1 explained, only a few state
constitutions expressly address partisan fairness in districting.)
Congress and Disaggregated Redistricting. The representational
adequacy/legislative duty approach can handle the disaggregated
redistricting of Congress. We saw in Part I that disaggregated
redistricting means that the national map of congressional districts
is often in flux, which makes it hard for a court to establish how
severe the partisan bias or lack of responsiveness is at any point in
time. We also saw that disaggregated redistricting leaves courts
with massive, standardless discretion at the remedy stage because
partisan-bias or lack-of-responsiveness violations could be remedied
by redrawing congressional districts anywhere in the country.
If plaintiffs develop a theory of legislative duty by analogy to the
education cases, it is not so critical that they identify “the map” of
congressional districts at any point in time. As Part II.A.3 ex-
plained, the overall quality of the system of public schools is a joint
product of state and local decisions, which are constantly in flux.
This has not prevented courts from recognizing a legislative duty to
issue standards or finding the state’s school system as a whole
constitutionally inadequate. Findings of unconstitutionality in the
education context are usually associated with severe, persistent ed-
ucational inequalities.226 It is the track record and likely future of
the state’s educational system that prompts judicial intervention,
rather than the level of educational quality or opportunity observed
at a moment in time.227 Similarly, the strength of the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument for implied legislative duties in representational adequacy
226. See generally Ryan, supra note 154.
227. See supra note 168.
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cases will turn much more on the evidence concerning the history
and likely future of representational harms than on the particulars
of the legally operative map of legislative districts at a moment in
time.
As for remedying aggregate harms from disaggregated redistrict-
ing, a court that finds an implied congressional duty to establish
partisan fairness and responsiveness standards for the system of
congressional districts could easily hold that any reasonable legis-
lative remedy must include procedures for ascertaining compliance
with the legislated standards and curing violations. In the education
setting, courts have told the legislature to establish mechanisms for
oversight and reform of schools that persistently fall short of state
standards.228 At least two courts have found their state’s school ac-
countability system constitutionally inadequate, and other courts
have carefully reviewed accountability systems before approving
them.229 Translating this idea to congressional districting, a court
might hold that Congress must enact legal norms or presumptions
that would allow courts to determine as matter of law what is “the
map” of congressional districts, and that would channel the court’s
remedial discretion.230
The Manageability Puzzle. The Gordian Knot of partisan gerry-
mandering litigation is that the judicially discoverable constitu-
tional standards have been regarded as unmanageable, and the
judicially manageable standards as undiscoverable, that is, as insuf-
ficiently tethered to constitutional norms.231 The representational
adequacy/legislative duty approach untangles this knot by partition-
ing responsibilities across institutions. It calls on courts to “discov-
er” mainly that the Constitution under present conditions requires
some reasonable limitation on redistricting for partisan advantage,
and that the Constitution vests primary responsibility for the
228. See supra Part II.B.2.
229. See cases cited supra note 159.
230. For example, the legislated framework might provide: (1) that for purposes of repre-
sentational adequacy challenges to congressional districts, “the map” of districts is the then-
operative map in each state or, if no such map exists, a judge-drawn map that mimics the
most recently operative map to the maximum feasible extent; and (2) that violations shall be
remedied by permuting a list of the fifty states and redrawing state congressional delegations
in order, going down the permuted list until compliance with the legislated standards is
achieved.
231. See supra Part I.A.
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development of standards in the legislature. The first proposition is
not far removed from the recognition in Vieth that extreme partisan
gerrymanders are unconstitutional,232 and the second accords with
the Supreme Court’s repeated statements that redistricting is pri-
marily a job for the political branches.233 As between various
reasonable limitations on partisan/ideological bias and lack of
responsiveness, the Constitution is indifferent. But if the legisla-
ture, given an ample period of time, fails to adopt some reasonable
limitation, the courts would prescribe a “manageable” fallback,
subject to legislative revision. In this way, the courts could create
bright-line rules for policing gerrymanders without also holding,
implausibly, that the Constitution entails a particular metric of bias
and a particular cutoff to separate constitutionally acceptable from
unconstitutionally extreme bias.
As a solution to the manageability problem, the representational
adequacy/legislative duty approach heavily depends on an idea
voiced by Justice Scalia in Vieth v. Jubelirer: the manageability of
a less-than-determinate legal standard depends on how frequently
it must be applied.234 The representational adequacy/legislative du-
ty approach would engender three distinct species of partisan ger-
rymandering claims, which are likely to be litigated with different
frequencies, and which would be resolved on the basis of different
kinds of standards. 
One set of cases (Type I) would concern triggering conditions for
the legislative duty. The court would decide whether representation-
al adequacy had deteriorated (or been threatened) to such a degree,
and whether the technology for standard setting had developed to
such a degree, that the legislature must establish a redistricting
framework with enforceable criteria for partisan/ideological fairness
and responsiveness. Type II cases would concern the reasonableness
of legislatively promulgated frameworks. Type III cases would as-
sess redistricters’ compliance with the framework.
232. See Berman, supra note 26, at 782.
233. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41 (1982) (per curiam) (“From the beginning,
we have recognized that ‘reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration
and determination.’” (quoting White v. Wieser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1973))). 
234. See 541 U.S. 267, 285-86 (2004) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument
for policing partisan gerrymanders using standards adapted from racial gerrymandering cases
because partisan motives in redistricting are ubiquitous whereas racial motives are much less
common).
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Type I representational adequacy cases—raising the question of
whether the legislature must promulgate a redistricting framework
for representational adequacy—would be largely one-shot cases in
much the same way as justiciability cases are one-shot cases. They
would be litigated on the basis of similarly indeterminate legal stan-
dards and kitchen-sink evidentiary records.235 Just as the threshold
question of whether to treat a constitutional injury as justiciable
requires an open-ended weighing of costs and benefits,236 so too does
the threshold question of whether to require legislative promulga-
tion of redistricting standards. Note also that Type I decisions would
not invalidate any map of legislative districts; as such, these cases
have less potential than conventional partisan gerrymander claims
to engender criticism of the courts for partisan favoritism. The need
for a constraining legal standard is therefore less acute.
Of course, the decision about whether to recognize a justiciable
legislative duty in a Type I case must account for potential manage-
ability problems in Type II and Type III cases.
In the education setting, courts have usually handled Type II
cases by spelling out a few loose guidelines for the legislature to
follow,237 giving broad but not unquestioning deference to legisla-
tion enacted to implement the guidelines.238 The same strategy could
work for redistricting. For example, a court might say that the leg-
islated standards must be designed to ensure that the party that
wins a majority of the votes earns a majority of the seats; that there
is a reasonable number of competitive seats; and that the map is
roughly symmetrical between the parties according to the legisla-
tively chosen measure of symmetry. And, just as some courts have
235. To be sure, if a court were to find that no such duty exists given current conditions,
the duty question could be relitigated in the future if conditions change. But that is not much
different than asking the courts to revisit a nonjusticiability holding in light of changed
conditions. 
236. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1295 (2006).
237. See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 176-79 (S.C. 2014)
(declining on separation of powers grounds “to provide the General Assembly with a specific
solution to the constitutional violation” but discussing as “instructive” the educational
frameworks commended by courts in New York and Wyoming), amended by 777 S.E.2d 547
(S.C. 2015), and superseded and amended by 780 S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 2015).
238. Some courts have refrained from issuing guidelines; others have been quite specific
in “advising” the legislature. For a review of the academic commentary on this point, see
Bauries, supra note 85, at 721-34.
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required the legislature to provide for accountability measures that
kick in when schools fail to achieve educational standards,239 a court
might require the legislature to specify a process for updating maps
when the fairness and responsiveness standards are not achieved.240
Naturally, judicial evaluation of the reasonableness of legislated
frameworks would be informed by justiciability considerations. If
judges believe that they may only review partisan or ideological fair-
ness claims concerning particular legislative maps using bright-line
rules, then the legislature in promulgating standards will have
breached its duty of care if the standards are not sufficiently pre-
cise.241 To the extent that judges insist on legislative promulgation
of bright-line rules in Type II cases, there is no need to worry about
the manageability of Type III cases. These cases will be manageable
by construction. Courts will simply refuse to hear them until such
time as appropriate, judicially manageable standards come into
being. In all likelihood these will be legislated standards, but if the
legislature drags its feet or issues ridiculous standards, the courts
may institute a provisional judge-made alternative.
I concede that there is some risk of a protracted conflict between
courts and lawmakers over the reasonableness of legislated redis-
tricting frameworks, such as in Type II cases. I respond to this con-
cern in the “objections” Section below.242
D. State Law, Article I, or Equal Protection?
As a pragmatic strategy for policing partisan gerrymanders, the
representational adequacy/legislative duty approach is quite attrac-
tive. Doctrinally it may prove a harder sell. We saw in Part II.A.1
that neither the U.S. Constitution nor most state constitutions spe-
cifically address partisan/ideological fairness or responsiveness in
districting. A theory about representational adequacy and legisla-
tive duties will in most cases have to be patched together from text-
ual provisions cast at a high level of generality. This Section offers
239. See cases cited supra note 159.
240. As noted above, this provision would be critical for any framework for congressional
districting because of the remedial-discretion problem.
241. Unless, perhaps, the legislature provides for review and enforcement of the standards
by a nonjudicial institution.
242. See infra Part III.E.1.
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a few thoughts about strategies for establishing the theory. I revisit
several potential textual anchors, including state constitutional
provisions, Article I, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Litigators should probably advance the theory first under state
constitutional law, focusing on two sets of states: (1) those whose
constitutions include what Justin Levitt terms “prohibitions on
undue favoritism” in districting;243 and (2) those whose courts have
recognized legislative duties under generally worded education
clauses, and whose constitution has similarly general provisions
about “free and open” elections or voters’ “equal right to elect.”244
The former states present the best opportunity for making strong
arguments grounded in the constitutional text; the latter for ar-
guments by analogy to education precedents.245 The table in the On-
line Appendix identifies these states—twenty-two in total.246
Attorneys bringing state law claims should aim their fire on state
legislative gerrymanders, not congressional districting. Because the
normative value of a competitive or party-symmetric map of con-
gressional districts in a given state depends on how congressional
districts are drawn in other states,247 it makes little sense to read
state constitutions as establishing a legislative duty to promulgate
state-specific criteria for congressional districting.248
243. See Levitt, supra note 94.
244. The existence of such general provisions is designated in columns one and two of the
table in the Online Appendix. Elmendorf, supra note 5.
245. The arguable separation of powers objection to “abstract” judicial declarations about
legislative duties will be substantially undercut if the state’s courts have made such
declarations under analogous provisions of the state’s constitution.
246. See Elmendorf, supra note 5. Litigators should also target states whose electorates are
roughly split between Democrats and Republicans. In one-party states, the high court and the
legislature are likely to be closely politically aligned, both presently and in their expectations
about the future, and the court may therefore resist arguments for constitutional limitations
on political gerrymanders.
247. See supra Part I.C.
248. However, if a group of states were to undertake to develop a coordinated process for
congressional districting, subject to normative criteria that would apply to all of their dis-
tricts, courts in these and other states might read their state constitutions as obligating the
legislature to cooperate in this effort. (A bill to form an interstate redistricting compact be-
tween Maryland and Virginia has been introduced in Maryland. See Rob Richie & Austin
Plier, Maryland Can’t Act Alone to End Gerrymandering, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/maryland-cant-act-alone-to-end-gerrymandering/
2016/03/25/ccc27542-e61d-11e5-bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html?utm_term=.f7d84a541387
[https://perma.cc/E39B-VJRL].) But without some prospect of coordinated redistricting, it is
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Given the collective action barriers to bottom-up coordination of
congressional redistricting across states, partisan fairness and re-
sponsiveness standards for the aggregate map of congressional dis-
tricts and procedures for adjusting state-specific maps to comport
with those standards probably have to come from Congress. Article
I may provide the requisite textual hook for an implied congressio-
nal duty to enact a redistricting framework addressed to partisan/
ideological fairness and responsiveness, but litigating this theory
would be an uphill climb for many reasons.249 I see little prospect for
a robust representational adequacy jurisprudence under Article I—
unless state courts lead the way in recognizing analogous duties
under state constitutions and the state constitutional experiment
comes to be seen as a great success.
The remaining option is to try to shoehorn the representational
adequacy approach into equal protection or First Amendment doc-
trine. It may be possible to do this using rebuttable presumptions
that function as penalty defaults and thereby prod legislatures into
promulgating partisan/ideological fairness criteria. However,
because it may be mooted by Whitford, I shall provide only a brief,
doubtful that a state constitutional commitment to representational adequacy has much
bearing on the drawing of congressional districts. At most, the commitment might require
that congressional districts keep “communities of interest” and/or media markets intact,
absent a legitimate reason to depart from these criteria.
249. The Supreme Court has described the Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1,
as “impos[ing] the duty” to regulate congressional elections upon the states, while conferring
upon Congress “the power to alter [state] regulations or supplant them altogether.” Arizona
v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8 (2013). The implication is that Congress’s
role is discretionary, though perhaps it would be an abuse of discretion for Congress not to
prescribe a new redistricting framework under contemporary conditions. See MCGANN ET AL.,
supra note 36, at 205-10.
A further complication is the lack of precedent for judicial review of congressional inaction.
There would also be serious questions about standing because “representational inadequacy”
is a broadly shared injury; because it is speculative whether any voter presently dissatisfied
with her congressional district would see her district redrawn if Congress were to establish
a new framework for congressional districting; and because federal courts might conclude that
they lack authority to provide a remedy if Congress fails to act. Some of these barriers might
be overcome by analogy to administrative law, where courts have allowed challenges to
agency failures to initiate rulemaking, see, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-35
(2007), and relaxed causation and redressability requirements when plaintiffs allege that the
agency failed to comply with proper procedures, see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
572 n.7 (1992) (“The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability
and immediacy.”).
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footnote-level sketch of the argument, leaving its development for
another day.250
250. The argument would run roughly as follows: All nine Justices in Vieth agreed that par-
tisan gerrymanders that “go too far” violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Berman, supra
note 26, at 782. Yet the lesson of Bandemer, Vieth, and LULAC is that the crafting of effects-
based standards for policing partisan gerrymanders is beyond the judicial ken. This seems to
leave courts with two choices: either hold partisan gerrymanders nonjusticiable, or presume
that partisan intent renders the map of legislative districts unconstitutional. A conclusive
presumption of excessive partisanship from partisan intent would be contrary to the position
of all nine Justices in Vieth that such gerrymanders are permissible if they do not go too far.
See id. Additionally, a conclusive presumption would contravene Justice Kennedy’s premise
that partisan gerrymandering claims generally should not succeed unless plaintiffs “show a
burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on [their] representational rights.” LULAC v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2008) (Kennedy, J.).
But these problems would not arise if states could rebut the presumption of excessive par-
tisanship by showing that the map at issue complied with reasonable, legislatively promul-
gated standards for partisan or ideological fairness. This rebuttable-presumption framework
would have two important effects. First, it would give legislators a very strong political
incentive to enact fairness criteria, because without such criteria partisan objectives could not
be pursued at all. Consequently, it is unlikely that courts would often strike legislative maps
as partisan gerrymanders without plaintiffs “show[ing] a burden, as measured by a reliable
standard, on [their] representational rights.” See id. The reliable standard in question would
be chosen and codified by the relevant legislature. Different states would no doubt come up
with different standards, but that is a feature, not a bug. On this understanding, what equal
protection requires is simply that states, in drawing legislative districts, act in accordance
with some reasonable conception of democratic fairness. See id. at 414 (majority opinion).
Because there are many such conceptions, the standards can vary from state to state, so long
as they are reasonably designed to achieve certain minimal objectives, such as preventing an
ideological or partisan minority from securing a majority of seats in the legislature.
Notice that this approach would shunt much of the litigation over partisan bias into state
court, at least in cases about state legislative maps. This follows from Growe v. Emison, which
states that federal courts must “defer consideration of disputes involving redistricting where
the State, through its legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that highly political
task itself.” 507 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). Federal courts would determine whether a state’s redis-
tricting framework was sufficient to rebut the presumption of excessive partisanship, but the
retail-level decisions about whether particular enacted maps comply with a state’s partisan
fairness criteria and procedural rules would be made in state tribunals. Id. This is significant
for the manageability of the federal courts’ equal protection jurisprudence, for as we have
seen, the manageability of a legal standard for political question purposes depends on the
frequency with which the courts must apply it. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
However, cases about congressional maps would probably be litigated in federal court since
the corresponding criteria for partisan/ideological fairness would almost certainly have to be
prescribed in federal legislation. It would not make sense to treat compliance with state-
specific criteria as sufficient to rebut the presumption of excessive partisanship with respect
to congressional maps, because, as we saw in Part I.C, extreme bias in any given state’s map
may actually reduce rather than increase the level of bias in the congressional map as a
whole.
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E. Some Objections
This Section addresses four objections to the idea of fashioning a
partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence on the template of the
educational adequacy cases: (1) that the model will merely induce
protracted, standardless battles over the reasonableness of legisla-
tively promulgated standards; (2) that the model is motivated by a
mistaken premise about “judicially discoverable and manageable”
standards; (3) that the model runs afoul of the separation of pow-
ers; and (4) that the model depends too much on state courts, which
may lack the necessary political independence to police gerryman-
ders. In considering the last objection, I provide an overview of cases
litigated under state constitutional theories in connection with the
1990, 2000, and 2010 redistricting cycles. Almost all of these cases
concern compliance with explicit criteria for legislative districts,
rather than broadly worded provisions about electoral fairness and
integrity.
1. Reverse-Engineered Standards and Intractable “Type II”
Disputes
There are two respects in which the representational adequacy
problem may diverge from its educational analogue in ways that
might be thought to undermine the legislative-duty strategy for
“managing” constitutional disputes.
First, politics: Courts in education cases sometimes provide useful
political cover for lawmakers who want to pursue reforms but face
resistance from constituents or interest groups.251 This dynamic is
unlikely to be present in representational adequacy cases, where ju-
dicial interventions could jeopardize incumbents’ job security and
the majority party’s ability to protect its majority. Judges weighing
representational adequacy claims will probably anticipate intense
pushback from the legislative branch.
Second, computer technology has made it very easy to draw maps
and evaluate them according to any number of specified criteria and
251. See Koski, supra note 148, at 1271-72 (discussing political context of the Kentucky
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Rose).
1666 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1601
metrics.252 Legislators could try to exploit the variety of plausible
normative criteria and metrics by first drawing the map they
want—say, to protect incumbents, or to advantage the dominant
political party—and then reverse engineering normative “stan-
dards” that would justify the map. (It is harder to reverse-engineer
educational standards so as to justify a program of educational
reform.253)
If courts find a legislative duty to promulgate redistricting cri-
teria in advance of mapmaking, we might enter a world in which
many state legislatures issue a new set of reverse-engineered cri-
teria every ten years, shortly after the release of the census data.
Plaintiffs who dislike the ensuing map will ask courts to invalidate
the legislated criteria. The survival of the legislature’s criteria will
turn on judicial application of a fuzzy “reasonableness” standard,254
with the fate of the maps likely hanging in the balance. If the court
rejects the legislated standards and invalidates the maps, the leg-
islature may respond by issuing a new set of reverse-engineered
criteria and then another map, forcing the court to apply the fuzzy
reasonableness test yet again. The world so feared by opponents of
standardless judicial review in partisan gerrymandering cases will
have been realized, albeit with the battle shifting from the Type III
question of whether the enacted maps are constitutionally permissi-
ble to the Type II question of whether the legislature reasonably
exercised its duty to promulgate an adequate redistricting frame-
work.
This scenario is not far-fetched, but neither is it fatal to my pro-
posal. There are at least three reasonable ways for courts to deal
with it, short of simply rejecting the premise that such conflicts are
to be avoided.255 First, a cautious court could adopt a very deferential
252. For a high-tech example, see Yan Y. Liu et al., PEAR: A Massively Parallel Evolution-
ary Computation Approach for Political Redistricting Optimization and Analysis, 30 SWARM
& EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 78, 80-86 (2016). For discussion of lower-tech examples
tailored for use by the general public, see Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, Technology
for Public Participation in Redistricting, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE
WEST 247, 250-58 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
253. This is so because of tremendous uncertainty about what reforms would help to
achieve state standards, particularly for high-poverty student populations. See generally
Elmendorf & Shanske, supra note 71 (manuscript at 8-20).
254. Alternatively, the court would apply the previous legislated standards, if deemed rea-
sonable.
255. That courts have managed educational adequacy litigation with fuzzy standards
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standard of review for Type II cases. Virtually any legislative choice
of nonpartisan districting criteria would be accepted. If the upshot
is a spate of reverse-engineered partisan gerrymanders or
incumbency-protection plans, so be it. At least the legislature will
have to justify its plans according to some set of public-spirited
criteria, rather than as partisan power grabs. As Justin Levitt has
suggested, any reform that induces redistricters to explain their
choices in public-regarding terms should help to reinforce norms of
fair play.256
Alternatively, the court could spell out some pretty clear limits on
what it will accept as “reasonable” redistricting criteria. For exam-
ple, the court might say that because voting and representation is
largely mediated by political parties,257 the legislature must justify
perhaps suggests that the familiar arguments for bright-line rules in partisan gerrymander-
ing cases are overblown.
256. Justin Levitt, Presentation at the William & Mary Law Review Symposium: 2020
Redistricting (Feb. 18, 2017).
257. Legislators self-organize into party caucuses and delegate critical responsibilities to
party leaders. See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 208-11 (1995). Within a party caucus, the roll-call votes of
representatives are only weakly correlated with district-level measures of citizen ideology. See
Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666, 670-
72 (2009) (estimating that 80 percent of polarization in the House of Representatives reflects
divergence between how a Democrat and Republican would represent the same district, as
opposed to divergence in voter preferences across districts). To be sure, some territorial repre-
sentation does occur in the form of constituent service, but even this is filtered through party:
citizens greatly prefer to communicate with own-party legislators. See David E. Broockman
& Timothy J. Ryan, Preaching to the Choir: Americans Prefer Communicating to Copartisan
Elected Officials, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1093 (2016). Likewise, legislators systematically discount
the opinions of constituents who affiliate with the other party. See Daniel M. Butler & Adam
M. Dynes, How Politicians Discount the Opinions of Constituents with Whom They Disagree,
60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 975 (2016).
Vote choice in congressional and state legislative elections appears to be largely driven by
partisanship, retrospective evaluations of the President, and to some extent ideological prox-
imity. The relevant literature is vast. See, e.g., GARY C. JACOBSON & JAMIE L. CARSON, THE
POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 123-24 (9th ed. 2016) (discussing partisanship and
voting in congressional elections); Stephen Ansolabehere & Philip Edward Jones,
Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll-Call Voting, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 583, 589-90, 596
(2010) (discussing partisanship and perceived agreement with roll-call votes as factors in
voting in congressional elections); Danielle A. Joesten & Walter J. Stone, Reassessing
Proximity Voting: Expertise, Party, and Choice in Congressional Elections, 76 J. POLITICS 740,
741, 749-50 (2014) (finding that the vast majority of voters support the more ideologically
proximate candidate in congressional elections, but that “cross-pressured” partisans—self-
identified Democrats who are ideologically closer to the Republican candidate, and self-
identified Republicans who are closer to the Democratic candidate—voted more often for the
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its redistricting framework in terms of a theory of effective partisan
competition. The court might further hold that this requires draw-
ing districts so that: (1) the median district leans toward the party
preferred by most eligible voters in the state; (2) partisan asymme-
try (somehow measured) is not more than one standard deviation
worse than the historical average; and (3) the number of competitive
districts exceeds some constitutional minimum. Though aggressive,
this holding would allow the legislature to choose among the pro-
fessionally accepted metrics of partisan bias, competition, and dis-
trict-level preference. It would also give the legislature a zone of
discretion to make trade-offs between partisan fairness and other
considerations, such as respect for territorial communities or ad-
herence to political subdivision boundaries. What is most important
for present purposes is that this holding would define the zone of
legislative discretion with clarity. Decisions in the zone would pass
muster; everything outside of it would be rejected.
The third way for courts to respond to envelope-pushing legis-
latures in Type II cases is to hold that any reasonable redistricting
framework must address and limit incentives for partisan and in-
cumbency-protection excesses. This might be done with timing
rules, as Adam Cox has argued.258 For example, the court might hold
that legislated criteria must be established at least one session prior
copartisan than the ideologically proximate candidate); Benjamin J. Kassow & Charles J.
Finocchiaro, Responsiveness and Electoral Accountability in the U.S. Senate, 39 AM. POL. RES.
1019, 1027-38 (2011) (modeling effects of ideological extremity, presidential approval, and
other factors); Steven Rogers, National Forces in State Legislative Elections, 667 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 207, 220 (2016) (finding that, compared to state legislative approval,
“changes in presidential approval have at least three times the impact on voters’ decision-
making in state legislative elections”); Boris Shor & Jon C. Rogowski, Ideology and the US
Congressional Vote, POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS, May 23, 2016, at 1-3, 17-19, 26, https://www.
cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/ideology-and-the-
us-congressional-vote/0694B5A73DDA9594D16A46E71B1D0E26 [https://perma.cc/Q5MV-
9CRW] (finding strong evidence of spatial voting in congressional elections, albeit with
Democratic and Republican respondents strongly biased toward their copartisan candidates).
Because few voters know much about the actions of their legislative representatives, elec-
toral accountability must be mediated by political parties. See generally Christopher S.
Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and
Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363. Members of Congress behave as if their personal elec-
toral fortunes are strongly tied to public opinion about the majority party as a whole. See
Andrew J. Taylor, Which U.S. House Members Present Their Legislative Records? Models of
Electoral Accountability and the Content of Press Releases, 44 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 102,
104 (2017).
258. See Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 ELECTION L.J. 412 (2006).
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to the drawing of maps. Standing and ripeness doctrines could then
be used to defer legal challenges to the criteria until the legislature
revises the map. If the legislature’s criteria were not accepted by the
court, the legislature on remand would be unable to enact new
criteria to govern mapmaking for the next election. The maps would
have to be redrawn in accordance with previously established cri-
teria, or provisional judge-made standards, rather than new criteria
reverse-engineered to justify the current legislature’s preferred
map.
To further discourage legislative overreach, the court might deem
mid-decade redistricting constitutionally impermissible (several
state courts have done so already259). That would prevent the legis-
lature from answering a judicial invalidation of its criteria by issu-
ing new criteria and then a new map in the next legislative session.
If legislated redistricting criteria cannot be evaluated by the courts
pre-redistricting (because of ripeness/standing), and if the legisla-
ture cannot respond to an adverse court decision by revising the
criteria for purposes of maps that will govern the next decade of
elections (because of the one-session-in-advance rule for issuing cri-
teria and the no-mid-decade-redistricting rule), then the legislature
will probably adopt criteria that stay well within the bounds of
reasonableness.260
Importantly, the no-mid-decade-redistricting rule would reduce
the number of Type II cases that the courts confront.261 The rule
would have this effect directly by precluding re-redistricting be-
tween census years. As well, by raising the stakes of judicial inval-
idation of legislated criteria, the rule would encourage legislatures
to redistrict pursuant to previously established, judicially validated
criteria. Finally, insofar as the rule discourages legislative over-
reach in the choice of redistricting standards, there would be fewer
“strong” potential claims for plaintiffs to bring when standards are
259. See Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” out of Redistricting: State
Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1264-66 (2007).
260. Cox argues that prohibitions on mid-decade redistricting are salutatory because they
put line-drawers behind a “partial veil of ignorance” regarding the distribution of voters
across districts over the life of the plan. Cox, supra note 258, at 418-19.
261. Recall, per Vieth, that the manageability of a fuzzy standard depends on how often it
must be applied in sensitive cases. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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adopted or changed, and thus, in all likelihood, fewer Type II claims
reaching the courts. 
Beyond the timing rules, state supreme courts may discourage
legislative overreach by establishing venue and case-management
procedures that engender ex ante uncertainty about the ideology of
reviewing courts.262 For example, redistricting cases could be assign-
ed to a trial judge chosen by lot from the state’s population of trial
judges. Complementing this randomization, the state supreme court
could hold that questions about the reasonableness of legislated
criteria, and about maps’ compliance with the criteria, are mixed
questions of law and fact subject to clear error appellate review.263
This would privilege the reasonableness judgment of an “ideologi-
cally random” trial court over the judgment of the state supreme
court, whose ideology will usually be known to mapmakers. The
resulting uncertainty should induce legislators to exercise some
restraint even during periods when a majority of the state supreme
court is ideologically aligned with the majority party in the legisla-
ture.
Finally, the state supreme court could invite the legislature to
establish checks on judicial overreaching. To illustrate, the legisla-
ture might partition merits-review and remedial responsibilities
among judges, stipulating that if a court finds the legislated frame-
work for redistricting unconstitutional, the remedy stage of the
proceeding and the determination of whether enacted maps are
permissible must be assigned to other judges. This partitioning of
responsibilities would ensure that no judge could arrogate map-
invalidation or map-redrawing powers to himself by holding the
redistricting framework unconstitutional.264
262. In twenty-two states, the state supreme court has exclusive rulemaking authority with
respect to the judicial system. See generally CHRISTOPHER REINHART & GEORGE COPPOLO, CAL.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, 2008-R-0430, COURT RULES IN OTHER STATES—LEGISLA-
TIVE APPROVAL (2008).
263. Cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 78-79 (1986) (holding that clear error review
applies to a district court’s finding of vote dilution under the Federal Voting Rights Act).
264. A power-loving trial judge is probably less likely to find the redistricting criteria
unconstitutional if he has been divested of map-review and remedial authority.
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2. Is the Legislative Duty Superfluous?
This Article’s account of the manageability dilemma that has
confounded equal protection challenges to partisan gerrymanders
presupposes that federal courts, having determined that the Consti-
tution requires some limit on partisanship in redistricting, may not
simply pick a metric of partisan bias and a threshold for how much
is too much unless the Constitution (properly understood) actually
privileges that particular metric and cutoff.265 The recognition of a
legislative duty to promulgate standards is a way around this di-
lemma, because it vests the choice among metrics/thresholds in
another institution and conceptualizes any judicially established
standard as a stop-gap remedy for the legislature’s failure to act,
rather than as a specification of what the Constitution commands.
But perhaps the legislative-duty part is unnecessary. Perhaps the
courts, having determined that some limit is necessary, may pick
whatever metric and cutoff seems best at the time, while allowing
legislative revisions.266 Many scholars have argued that the U.S.
Supreme Court sometimes creates legislatively revisable doctrinal
rules to implement constitutional norms.267 The leading example is
Miranda v. Arizona, which established the rule that police officers,
prior to interrogating a person in custody, must inform the subject
“in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain
silent.”268 But the Court also indicated that the Miranda-warning
requirement was provisional.269 It was to remain in place unless or
until “we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective
in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring
a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”270 Similarly, in Smith v.
265. See supra Part I.A.
266. For a thoughtful argument along these lines, see Berman, supra note 26.
267. The seminal paper in this vast literature is Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court,
1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1975) (arguing
that the Supreme Court produces both “Marbury-shielded constitutional exegesis and congres-
sionally reversible constitutional law”). For a more recent effort to typologize judge-made
constitutional rules subject to legislative revision or avoidance, see Ferejohn & Friedman,
supra note 172.
268. 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
269. See id. at 467.
270. Id. As the Court remarked,
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of
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Robbins, the Court characterized the procedure for withdrawal of
defense counsel stipulated by Anders v. California271 as a “prophy-
lactic framework” intended “to vindicate the constitutional right to
appellate counsel,” rather than as a “constitutional command.”272
Because “the Constitution itself does not compel the Anders proce-
dure,” the states remained free to adopt alternatives.273
If one sees legislatively revisable rules as an ordinary part of
constitutional doctrine, then the Gordian Knot of partisan gerry-
mandering jurisprudence is pretty easy to untangle. The courts just
need to choose a metric of partisan bias and a cutoff for how much
is too much, while stating that legislatures may enact reasonable
alternatives. I am sympathetic to this approach, which seems much
more plausible than holding that equal protection entails a particu-
lar metric and cutoff, but there remain significant objections.
First and most basically, the proposition that federal courts have
authority to craft doctrinal standards that go beyond what the
Constitution “commands” is hotly disputed.274 Second, the leading
examples of this practice, such as Robbins and Miranda, address
situations where constitutional noncompliance (ineffective appellate
counsel and coerced confessions) may be hard for courts to observe
absent the prophylactic rule.275 In both cases, the provisional judge-
made rule is information forcing. In the redistricting context, by
contrast, any judicially selected metric of partisan bias and cutoff
their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Consti-
tution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent
compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our
decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect.
Id.
271. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (requiring appointed criminal defense counsel who concludes
that appeal would be frivolous to file “a brief referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal”).
272. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 555 (1987)).
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 457-61 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (attacking prophylactic rules as illegitimate and offering backhanded praise to the major-
ity for not expressly embracing the position that Miranda was an unexceptional exercise of
an established judicial power to craft such rules); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in
Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 101-02, 123-
29, 163-64 (1985) (challenging constitutional legitimacy of prophylactic rules). 
275. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 280-81; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
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would essentially define the constitutional norm—how much of a
burden on partisan representational rights is too much—rather
than generate information that courts or other actors need to mea-
sure the burden. To treat such norm-defining doctrinal standards as
legislatively revisable would represent a fairly substantial break
with conventional, Marbury-derived understandings about the judi-
cial role, and might end up destabilizing important election law
precedents, such as the one-person, one-vote requirement of Rey-
nolds v. Sims.276
3. Reviewing Maps vs. Requiring Frameworks: Separation of
Powers Objections
One might argue on separation of powers grounds for an interpre-
tive presumption against implied legislative duties. For a court to
find a legislative duty is, in effect, to exert control over the legisla-
tive agenda, and due regard for the coordinate branches of govern-
ment arguably counsels against this. Also, when courts undertake
to implement broadly worded constitutional provisions about
education or representation by directing the legislature to establish
standards and evaluation systems, rather than by making record-
based determinations that particular schools or particular legisla-
tive maps are in fact constitutionally inadequate, the courts are
engaged in an essentially speculative enterprise. This is in tension
with the familiar notion that the courts’ job is to find facts and ap-
ply law to facts, leaving more speculative, policy-minded determin-
ations to the legislature.277
276. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); cf. Berman, supra note 26, at 836 (“[T]he one-person, one-vote
rule, at least as applied in congressional districting, is a [nonstandard] decision rule that
directs courts to conclusively presume that the challenged scheme is arbitrary and capricious
from the mere fact that it minimally departs from perfect equipopulousness.”). If equal
protection’s “operative proposition”—the constitutional command—requires only a nonarbi-
trary distribution of population across legislative districts, and if legislatures are generally
free to replace judge-made “decision rules” with other decision rules that reasonably im-
plement the “operative proposition,” then massive deviations from population equality could
suddenly become permissible. Cf. Berman, supra note 26, at 835-36. For example, a state
could probably require apportionment on a county basis rather than a population basis, at
least as to one house of the state legislature (by analogy to the U.S. Senate).
277. Cf. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419-20 (2006) (Kennedy, J.) (casting doubt on a
proposed symmetry standard for a partisan gerrymandering claim because it would enable
courts to invalidate maps before the predicted partisan injury had actually materialized). Note
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These arguments invite a couple of responses. The “it is too spec-
ulative” objection papers over the fact that rulings about the exis-
tence of manageable standards always depend on a speculative,
forward-looking weighing of costs and benefits.278 A ruling on the
existence and contours of the legislative duty would be analogous to
a justiciability ruling about manageable standards. The consid-
erations to be weighed are very similar, and the holding would be
meant to bring about the establishment of manageable standards.279
As for judicial incursions on the legislative agenda, the extent of
the incursion depends greatly on the remedy for legislative inaction.
If the remedy would be a provisional, judge-made standard, the in-
itial legislative remand just gives the legislature the option to act,
without compelling it. The intrusion would be far more severe if the
court threatened to hold the legislature in contempt, fine lawmak-
ers, or otherwise coerce legislative action. This is a reason for courts
to think carefully about remedies, but not to reject the representa-
tional adequacy/legislative duty approach altogether.
4. Dependence on Dependent State Courts
A final objection to the strategy I have sketched is that it rele-
gates the policing of state legislative gerrymanders to state courts.
State courts were notorious in the pre-Reynolds era for passivity in
the face of grossly malapportioned legislative districts.280 This pas-
sivity may have reflected a lack of political independence from state
legislatures, on whom state courts depend for their budgets.281 Such
dependencies may make state courts equally reluctant today to hear
or vindicate “representational adequacy” claims. Moreover, many
states in the present day are essentially one-party democracies, in
which Democrats or Republicans control the legislative and execu-
tive branches and comprise a supermajority of the electorate.282 The
also that one justice dissented from the canonical educational adequacy decision on the
ground that the court was issuing an advisory opinion. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 223-25 (Ky. 1989) (Leibson, J., dissenting).
278. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Part III.B.
280. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE
PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 95-99 (2008).
281. See id. at 96.
282. See BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 219.
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justices in these one-party states are likely to identify with the dom-
inant party, and may be reluctant to circumscribe its control over
redistricting.
These are potent concerns. Yet state courts appear to be waken-
ing to the problem of the gerrymander. Writing in 2006, David
Schultz compared state constitutional litigation in the 1990 and
2000 rounds of redistricting.283 In the 1990s, eleven state courts
heard challenges to reapportionment plans, but “only four ...
undertook more than a perfunctory analysis of their constitutions
and only two used it to invalidate all or part of a reapportionment
plan.”284 Both plaintiff victories turned on provisions requiring
legislative maps to respect political subdivision boundaries.285 After
the 2000 round of redistricting, nine cases were litigated in state
court.286 In seven of these cases, courts provided a substantial state
constitutional analysis, and in five cases, the map at issue was
invalidated in whole or in part.287 (Two state courts held mid-decade
redistricting unconstitutional on state grounds, in contrast to the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in LULAC v. Perry, which rejected
this per se rule.288)
My research assistants extended Schultz’s analysis and found
that state court engagement with redistricting increased during
the 2010 cycle. State constitutional claims were litigated in nine-
teen states.289 Plaintiffs prevailed in whole or in part in six of these
283. See David Schultz, Redistricting and the New Judicial Federalism: Reapportionment
Litigation Under State Constitutions, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1087 (2006).
284. Id. at 1129.
285. Id. at 1112.
286. Id. at 1129.
287. Id. Also, in a decision postdating Schultz’s paper, the Arizona Supreme Court engaged
in a substantial state constitutional analysis. See Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676, 686-87, 689 (Ariz. 2009) (upholding chal-
lenged maps because, inter alia, the redistricting commission “engage[d] in a deliberative
effort to accommodate” competitiveness and other goals).
288. Schultz, supra note 283, at 1131.
289. See In re 2011 Redistricting Cases, 294 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2012) (concerning com-
pliance with judge-made procedures designed to ensure that VRA districts do not deviate from
state constitutional requirements more than necessary); Vandermost v. Bowen, 269 P.3d 446
(Cal. 2012) (concerning interim maps to be used when enacted maps are put to a referendum
vote); In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 332 P.3d 108 (Colo. 2011) (per
curiam) (concerning compliance with state constitutional requirement about political
subdivision splits); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015)
(concerning partisan intent); Solomon v. Abercrombie, 270 P.3d 1013 (Haw. 2012) (per curiam)
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cases;290 additionally, the Arizona Supreme Court intervened to
protect the independence of the state’s nonpartisan redistricting
body.291 Notable too is that some of the courts that ruled for de-
fendants nonetheless carved out or suggested a substantial judicial
role in policing the redistricting process.292
(concerning state constitutional requirement about apportionment on the basis of “permanent
residents”); Twin Falls County v. Idaho Comm’n on Redistricting, 271 P.3d 1202 (Idaho 2012)
(concerning political subdivision splits); Legislative Research Comm’n v. Fischer, 366 S.W.3d
905 (Ky. 2012) (concerning political subdivision splits and inconsistent application of criteria
used to justify departures from perfect population equality); In re 2012 Legislative Districting,
80 A.3d 1073 (Md. 2013) (concerning subdivision splits); State ex rel. Teichman v. Carnahan,
357 S.W.3d 601 (Mo. 2012) (per curiam) (concerning county splits); Willems v. State, 325 P.3d
1204 (Mont. 2014) (concerning drawing of districts in relation to “holdover” state senators and
compliance with transparency and public participation requirements); City of Manchester v.
Sec’y of State, 48 A.3d 864 (N.H. 2012) (per curiam) (concerning compliance with traditional
districting criteria); Gonzales v. State Apportionment Comm’n, 53 A.3d 1230 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2012) (concerning legal standards and availability of private right of action under
generally worded provision of state constitution); Cohen v. Cuomo, 969 N.E.2d 754 (N.Y. 2012)
(per curiam) (concerning permissibility of adding an additional state senate seat); Dickson v.
Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. 2015) (concerning judge-made procedures for compliance with
traditional state constitutional criteria and the VRA and justiciability of claims under the
“Good of the Whole” provision of state constitution), vacated, 137 S.Ct. 2186 (2017); Wilson
v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012) (concerning compliance with compactness, contiguity,
and community-of-interest requirements, and whether there exists an implied constitutional
requirement of nonpartisanship in districting); Wilson v. Fallin (Wilson I ), 262 P.3d 741
(Okla. 2011) (concerning subjects for expedited, pre-implementation review of redistricting
maps in the state supreme court and the availability of more “fact-intensive” state
constitutional claims in post-enactment litigation in district court); Holt v. 2011 Legislative
Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam) (concerning compliance with
compactness, contiguity, and political subdivision integrity requirements); Moore v. State, 436
S.W.3d 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (concerning county splits); State ex rel. Cooper v. Tennant,
730 S.E.2d 368 (W. Va. 2012) (concerning partisan gerrymandering).
290. See In re 2011 Redistricting Cases, 294 P.3d at 1033, 1035, 1039 (invalidating map
because redistricters failed to follow judge-made procedures which require initially drawing
map to comply with the state constitution and then making the smallest possible adjustments
to bring map into compliance with VRA); In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly,
332 P.3d at 109 (invalidating the map for inadequate minimization of political subdivision
splits); Detzner, 172 So. 3d at 416 (upholding the trial court’s finding of constitutionally
proscribed partisan intent); Solomon, 270 P.3d at 1023-24 (invalidating the map for inade-
quate efforts to comply with constitutional requirement of apportionment on the basis of
“permanent residents”; redistricters failed to follow staff suggestions about adjustment of
census data); Twin Falls County, 271 P.3d at 1203 (invalidating the map on the basis of
excessive political subdivision splits); Holt, 38 A.3d at 761 (invalidating the map for
inadequate compliance with traditional districting criteria).
291. See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Brewer, 275 P.3d 1267, 1278 (Ariz. 2012)
(holding that the Governor’s stated grounds for removing the chairperson were constitution-
ally deficient).
292. See, e.g., Wilson v. State ex rel. State Election Bd. (Wilson II ), 270 P.3d at 155, 159
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In the post-2010 round of state constitutional redistricting liti-
gation, a number of plaintiffs asserted claims that went beyond ar-
guments about noncompliance with traditional districting criteria,
such as minimization of political subdivision splits. In Florida, the
courts found violations of a recently enacted state constitutional
prohibition on redistricting for partisan advantage.293 To similar
effect, Kentucky’s courts struck down a map because the legislature
had not consistently applied the criteria said to justify departures
from population equality.294 The inconsistency suggested that some
other impermissible purpose was probably at work.295 Most recently,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated the state’s congressio-
nal district map as a partisan gerrymander in contravention of the
“free and equal elections” clause of the state constitution.296 On the
other hand, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to infer a general obli-
gation of partisan impartiality from explicit constitutional require-
ments for compact, contiguous, and equally populated legislative
districts,297 and the West Virginia Supreme Court rejected a state
constitutional partisan gerrymandering claim largely on the basis
of U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions under the federal constitution.298
In Alaska and North Carolina, courts carefully reviewed circa-
2010 legislative maps for compliance with judge-made procedures
for redistricting.299 The procedures in question were crafted to help
(Okla. 2012) (Colbert, C.J., concurring) (stating that partisan gerrymanders should be policed
by courts in fact-intensive, post-implementation litigation); Wilson I, 262 P.3d at 749-50
(Colbert, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing that political gerrymanders can and should be policed
indirectly by insisting on compliance with traditional criteria such as compactness and respect
for communities of interest and political subdivisions); Moore, 436 S.W.3d at 788 (reviewing
county splits deferentially but intimating that a different approach might have been taken
if evidence of a bad motive had been presented). 
293. See Detzner, 172 So. 3d at 369, 416.
294. See Fischer, 366 S.W.3d at 908, 919.
295. See id.
296. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, No. 159 MM 2017, 2018 WL 750872
(Pa. Feb. 7, 2018); League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282
(Pa. 2018) (order) (per curiam).
297. See Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814, 819-20, 823 (Ohio 2012). The court did not
consider whether other, more generally worded provisions of the state constitution might yield
such a requirement.
298. See State ex rel. Cooper v. Tennant, 730 S.E.2d 368, 388-90 (W. Va. 2012).
299. In re 2011 Redistricting Cases, 294 P.3d 1032, 1033, 1036-38 (Alaska 2012) (requiring
redistricter to first draw maps pursuant to state constitutional criteria, without regard to
VRA, and then to make the minimal adjustments necessary to comply with VRA); Dickson v.
Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404, 413 (N.C. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 2186 (2017) (reviewing legisla-
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courts ascertain whether redistricters’ ostensible efforts to comply
with the federal Voting Rights Act’s required substantial departures
from state constitutional criteria.300 For present purposes, the par-
ticulars of these procedures are much less important than the larger
principle for which they stand: judges may concoct procedural re-
quirements for redistricting so as to facilitate judicial enforcement
of otherwise-hard-to-enforce constitutional norms. This is broadly
in keeping with the representational adequacy/legislative duty ap-
proach.301
Finally, plaintiffs litigating post-2010 maps in New Jersey, North
Carolina, and Missouri sought to remedy partisan bias or a lack of
competitive districts by invoking hortatory constitutional provisions
about popular authority and public officials’ duty to govern “for the
good of the whole.”302 These claims failed—and understandably so,
as the constitutional provisions in question were not addressed to
the electoral process as such. By contrast, the clauses on which
plaintiffs have relied in educational adequacy cases are unquestion-
ably about education.303 Similarly, the textual hooks for representa-
tional adequacy claims discussed in Part II.A.1 of this Article are
about elections. It is worth noting, however, that the Missouri Su-
preme Court did analogize the “good of the whole” provision of the
ture’s compliance with “nine criteria that the General Assembly must follow in drawing new
district lines,” including a temporal sequence for drawing “VRA” and “non-VRA” districts and
a number of bright-line rules about the crossing of county borders).
300. See In re 2011 Redistricting Cases, 294 P.3d at 1033, 1036-38; Dickson, 781 S.E.2d at
413. Curiously, while both courts require maps to be drawn in a particular sequence, one
requires VRA districts to be drawn before anything else, Dickson, 781 S.E.2d at 413, and the
other requires the initial maps to be drawn blind to the VRA, In re 2011 Redistricting Cases,
294 P.3d at 1033, 1036-38.
301. Of course, under the approach I have sketched, the legislature would have primary
responsibility for crafting these procedures. See supra Part III.A.
302. See Pearson v. Koster, 359 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Mo. 2012) (per curiam) (deeming “good of
the whole” and “general welfare” provisions of the state constitution nonjusticiable); Gonzales
v. State Apportionment Comm’n, 53 A.3d 1230, 1254-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012)
(finding no private right of action to enforce state constitutional provision which provides, “All
political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security,
and benefit of the people, and they have the right at all times to alter or reform the same,
whenever the public good may require it.” (quoting N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 2(a))); Dickson,
781 S.E.2d at 440 (finding nonjusticiable a state constitutional provision which provides, “All
political power is vested in and derived from the people; all government of right originates
from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the
whole.” N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 2.).
303. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
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state constitution to the education clause.304 In earlier school finance
cases, Missouri courts had found the education clause too lacking in
“specificity or direction” to be enforced judicially.305 Unsurprisingly,
the state supreme court deemed the even flabbier “good of the
whole” provision nonjusticiable.306 State courts in New Jersey and
North Carolina have been much more receptive to claims under the
education clauses,307 yet as best I can tell, the education analogy
was not advanced in redistricting litigation brought under “good of
the whole”-type provisions of the North Carolina and New Jersey
Constitutions.308
In summary, while there are reasons to worry about state court
dependence and partisanship, the trends in state court redistricting
jurisprudence leave me cautiously optimistic. State courts are will-
ing to enforce explicit redistricting criteria, and the stage is now set
for a new generation of claims under more open-ended electoral
provisions. No doubt some of these claims will fail on justiciability
grounds, but, with the education analogy and precedents close at
hand, others may well succeed.
CONCLUSION
This Article has outlined a new legal strategy for attacking maps
of legislative districts with high levels of ideological/partisan bias or
304. See Pearson, 359 S.W.3d at 42 (discussing MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“A general diffu-
sion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liber-
ties of the people, the general assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools.”)).
305. Id. (discussing Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 488 (Mo. 2009)).
Recall that nonjusticiability is the minority position among state courts in educational ade-
quacy cases. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
306. Pearson, 359 S.W.3d at 42. In another Missouri redistricting case, plaintiffs invoked
the “free and open elections” provision of the Missouri Constitution, Article I, Section 25, but
never advanced a theory about what it requires beyond the compactness, contiguity, and
population equality requirements found in Article III, Section 2 of the state constitution. See
Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 18 (Mo. 2012) (“[Plaintiffs] claim that the plan is
unconstitutional ... because the districts do not meet the requirements of contiguous territory,
compactness, and population equality.” (citing MO. CONST. art I, §§ 2, 25)).
307. See New Jersey, SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://schoolfunding.info/litigation-map/new-
jersey [https://perma.cc/3YCD-2AGB]; North Carolina, SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://school
funding.info/litigation-map/north-carolina [https://perma.cc/25VL-9C3V].
308. Neither education clauses nor educational adequacy precedents were mentioned by
the courts in Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 2186 (2017),
or Gonzales v. State Apportionment Commission, 53 A.3d 1230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2012).
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low levels of responsiveness. Inspired by the educational adequacy
cases, the strategy asks courts to recognize a legislative duty to
promulgate standards for districting, as well as a framework for
enforcing those standards. If the legislature abdicates its duty,
courts would issue provisional, judge-made standards, subject to
legislative revision.
I leave for future work a related question: Might the education
analogy prove equally valuable in cases about barriers to voting,
such as identification requirements, rollbacks in early voting, and
the like? Litigants have generally attacked these barriers piece-
meal,309 but a number of judges, both liberals and conservatives,
have suggested that the permissibility of any given voting require-
ment probably ought to depend on what else the state has done to
enable, or thwart, political participation.310 The educational ade-
quacy cases, which often turn on holistic evaluations of the state’s
system of public schools, may again prove instructive as courts feel
their way toward new models for judicial superintendence of the
voting process.
309. For a rare exception, see League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463,
466 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[P]laintiffs ... filed a sixty-six page, 212-paragraph complaint alleging ‘a
voting system in Ohio’ that suffers from ‘non-uniform standards, processes, and rules, and
that employs untrained or improperly trained personnel, and that has wholly inadequate
systems, procedures, and funding.’”).
310. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 607-08 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“A panoply of regulations, each apparently defensible when considered alone, may neverthe-
less have the combined effect of severely restricting [electoral] participation and competition.
Even if each part of a regulatory regime might be upheld if challenged separately, one or
another of these parts might have to fall if the overall scheme unreasonably curtails
associational freedoms.”); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014) (“To the extent
outcomes help to decide whether the state has provided an equal opportunity, we must look
not at Act 23[, the state’s voter-ID requirement,] in isolation but to the entire voting and
registration system.”); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 242
(4th Cir. 2014) (“By inspecting the different parts of House Bill 589 as if they existed in a
vacuum, the district court failed to consider the sum of those parts and their cumulative effect
on minority access to the ballot box.”); N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F.
Supp. 2d 322, 349 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (suggesting that the fact “that black North Carolinians
have reached ‘parity’ with whites in turnout for presidential elections” should figure heavily
in the analysis of alleged barriers to voting under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224
(4th Cir. 2014).
